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Intentions	  	   Anxiety	  has	  been	  a	  constituent	  of	  my	  being	  since	  I	  was	  a	  little	  girl.	  Before	  I	  began	  the	  study	  of	  philosophy,	  my	  moments	  of	  panic	  were	  exacerbated	  by	  my	  inability	  to	  articulate	  the	  overwhelming	  sensations	  and	  emotions	  brought	  about	  by	  anxiety.	  I	  felt	  completely	  alone;	  as	  my	  anxiety	  increased,	  so	  too	  did	  the	  space	  between	  myself	  and	  others.	  No	  one	  talks	  about	  anxiety,	  and	  in	  the	  instances	  I	  attempted	  to	  describe	  to	  those	  around	  me	  what	  was	  happening	  ‘inside	  me’,	  it	  seemed	  no	  one	  could	  relate.	  It	  appeared	  I	  was	  the	  sole	  individual	  on	  planet	  Earth	  who	  felt	  indescribably	  nervous	  for	  no	  reason	  whatsoever.	  It	  wasn’t	  shame	  so	  much	  as	  a	  sheer	  lack	  of	  adequate	  vocabulary	  that	  reinforced	  my	  silence.	  Even	  more	  frustrating	  was	  the	  fact	  that	  I	  was	  never	  able	  to	  decipher	  exactly	  what	  it	  was	  that	  had	  me	  so	  anxious.	  Strangely,	  the	  feeling	  assaulted	  me	  at	  seemingly	  random	  times;	  times	  in	  which	  danger	  was	  not	  visible,	  but	  rather	  sensed.	  	  	   It	  wasn’t	  until	  my	  sophomore	  year	  at	  Trinity	  College	  that	  anxiety	  became	  a	  topic	  of	  discussion	  in	  the	  classroom.	  In	  Philosophy	  of	  Ethics,	  Professor	  Donna	  Marcano	  discussed	  with	  our	  class	  the	  anxiety	  evoked	  in	  so-­‐called	  normal	  minded	  people,	  by	  mentally	  unstable	  individuals.	  The	  claim:	  we	  have	  anxiety	  about	  them	  because	  their	  actions	  are	  mysterious;	  they	  lack	  the	  predictability	  so	  favored	  by	  human	  nature.	  Alas,	  a	  seemingly	  simple	  concept	  that	  perfectly	  described	  so	  much	  of	  what	  I	  felt,	  and	  often	  times	  continue	  to	  feel.	  As	  my	  philosophical	  studies	  progressed,	  I	  developed	  a	  repertoire	  of	  words	  and	  concepts,	  which	  I	  had	  been	  searching	  for,	  for	  years.	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   In	  utter	  selfishness,	  my	  hope	  is	  for	  the	  following	  pursuit,	  to	  which	  my	  reader	  will	  be	  witness,	  ends	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  I	  am	  calmer	  and	  my	  reader	  is	  anxious.	  Within	  the	  framework	  of	  self-­‐	  liberation,	  I	  aim	  to	  draw	  strong	  ties	  between	  personal	  experience,	  and	  the	  views	  held	  by	  various	  thinkers,	  including	  Martin	  Heidegger,	  Søren	  Kierkegaard,	  and	  Jean-­‐Paul	  Sartre.	  Being	  and	  Time	  will	  serve	  as	  the	  lens	  through	  which	  I	  examine	  the	  texts	  of	  Søren	  Kierkegaard	  and	  Jean-­‐Paul	  Sartre.	  Their	  philosophies	  on	  anxiety	  serve	  as	  a	  voice	  for	  those	  who	  grapple	  with	  the	  phenomenon.	  I	  aim	  to	  illuminate	  the	  concept	  of	  anxiety	  by	  offering	  elucidating	  vocabulary,	  which	  philosophy	  offers	  its	  students.	  Perhaps	  then,	  those	  who	  have	  previously	  neglected	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  latent	  anxiety	  in	  all	  of	  us	  will	  discover	  the	  opportunity	  that	  lay	  beyond	  misconception,	  masked	  as	  something	  to	  fear.	  In	  considering	  the	  ultimate	  aim,	  I	  feel	  freed	  from	  the	  negativity	  that	  clings	  to	  anxiety.	  	   In	  viewing	  the	  potential	  benefits	  of	  anxiety,	  one	  necessarily	  views	  anxiety	  as	  a	  mediation	  between	  complacency	  and	  individuality,	  and	  thus	  individuality	  as	  an	  essential	  aspect	  of	  human	  existence.	  This	  essay	  works	  to	  define	  the	  two	  terms	  as	  they	  stand	  in	  opposition	  to	  one	  another.	  Most	  if	  not	  all	  excerpts	  examined	  here	  lend	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  anxiety	  as	  a	  form	  of	  progression.	  Progression	  is	  manifest	  in	  anxiety,	  just	  as	  it	  is	  manifest	  in	  philosophical	  thought.	  My	  analysis	  is	  further	  complicated	  by	  the	  notion	  that	  anxiety	  is	  a	  form	  of	  progression	  in	  and	  of	  itself;	  it	  is	  means	  to	  an	  end	  
and	  it	  is	  the	  end.	  	  Anxiety	  congruously	  works	  alongside	  the	  project	  of	  the	  human	  being.	  This	  is	  to	  say,	  anxiety	  aids	  in	  the	  already-­‐happening	  process	  of	  one’s	  advancement	  through	  space	  and	  time.	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   Complacency	  describes	  one’s	  state	  of	  being,	  insofar	  as	  the	  individual	  has	  not	  (yet)	  acknowledged	  the	  existence	  of	  anxiety.	  If	  one	  is	  complacent,	  it	  is	  due	  to	  her	  failure	  to	  channel	  the	  power	  anxiety	  can	  potentially	  provide.	  She	  neglects	  to	  test	  her	  endurance.	  {A	  note	  with	  regard	  to	  word	  choice:	  anxiety	  is	  not	  merely	  an	  experience,	  rather	  one	  endures	  anxiety.	  In	  experience,	  self-­‐involvement	  in	  the	  world	  is	  not	  a	  requirement.	  Of	  course	  an	  ideal	  experience	  is	  one	  that	  results	  in	  an	  acquisition	  of	  knowledge,	  or	  perhaps	  a	  self	  that	  is	  in	  some	  ways	  ‘better’	  than	  the	  self	  prior	  to	  its	  experience.	  However,	  experiences	  are	  often	  passive;	  they	  do	  not	  necessarily	  require	  tension,	  discomfort,	  or	  decision-­‐making.	  To	  endure	  is	  to	  experience	  tension,	  discomfort,	  decision-­‐making.	  For	  this	  reason,	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  the	  endurance	  of	  
anxiety.}	  Her	  life,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  she	  lacks	  the	  proper	  education	  is	  constituted	  by	  the	  life	  of	  others.	  (SK,	  CA)	  Because	  anxiety	  is	  a	  process	  of	  individualization,	  she	  is	  not	  individualized;	  her	  identity	  blends	  in	  with	  that	  of	  another,	  namely	  the	  Other.	  By	  examining	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  Other,	  I	  will	  be	  able	  to	  describe	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  Self	  and	  it’s	  particular	  orientation	  to	  the	  world.	  	  	  	  	   Individualization	  is	  the	  consequence,	  if	  she	  accepts	  anxiety	  in	  order	  to	  embark	  on	  the	  unpredictable	  journey	  whose	  end	  is	  marked	  by	  complete	  self-­‐	  realization.	  But	  this	  ‘end’	  is	  continuous,	  for	  the	  goal	  is	  to	  live	  continuously	  as	  the	  product	  of	  progression.	  Freedom,	  namely	  the	  ability	  to	  choose	  anxiety,	  will	  become	  important	  at	  this	  time.	  In	  the	  ‘moment’	  of	  choice,	  one	  possesses	  the	  freedom	  to	  return	  to	  complacency,	  or	  advance	  toward	  individualization.	  Or,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  choice,	  one	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  accept	  or	  reject	  progression.	  Acceptance/openness	  leads	  to	  progress,	  which	  in	  turn	  leads	  to	  more	  progress.	  But	  at	  what	  point	  in	  the	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progression	  does	  one	  achieve	  individualization?	  And	  if	  progression	  is	  progress	  toward	  a	  goal,	  what	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  progress	  after	  the	  goal	  is	  reached?	  When	  is	  the	  process	  complete?	  	  	  	  
Notes	  on	  the	  philosophers-­	  	   In	  Being	  and	  Time,	  Martin	  Heidegger	  forms	  the	  Dasein	  Analytic.	  Authenticity	  is	  the	  term	  used	  to	  describe	  Dasein,	  during	  and	  after	  one’s	  trajectory	  through	  the	  process	  of	  individualization,	  namely	  Angst,	  German	  for	  anxiety.	  By	  writing	  of	  Angst	  instead	  of	  anxiety,	  Heidegger	  works	  to	  stamp	  out	  the	  misuses	  of	  the	  word	  that	  have	  become	  commonplace.	  He	  writes,	  “…It	  is	  the	  business	  of	  philosophy	  to	  preserve	  the	  
power	  of	  the	  most	  elemental	  words	  in	  which	  Dasein	  expresses	  itself	  and	  to	  protect	  them	  from	  being	  flattened	  by	  the	  common	  understanding	  to	  the	  point	  of	  unintelligibility…”(BT,	  211)	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  word	  anxiety	  retains	  its	  power	  despite	  society’s	  attempted	  dilution.	  Throughout	  his	  text,	  Heidegger	  distinguishes	  between	  ‘I’	  and	  ‘they’,	  placing	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  mass	  on	  either	  side	  of	  an	  ambiguous	  ground.	  I,	  Dasein,	  is	  the	  authenticated	  individual,	  whereas	  ‘they’	  describes	  all	  that	  it	  means	  to	  be	  inauthentic.	  It	  is	  the	  journey	  to/through	  authentication	  that	  resonates	  greatly	  with	  me,	  and	  which	  I	  aim	  to	  fully	  explicate	  in	  this	  paper.	  Further	  commentary	  on	  anxiety	  includes	  the	  seeming	  irrelevance	  of	  the	  world	  and	  its	  parts,	  for	  she	  who	  endures	  anxiety.	  	  
	   In	  addition	  to	  its	  examination	  of	  anxiety,	  Søren	  Kierkegaard’s	  text,	  The	  
Concept	  of	  Anxiety,	  involves	  the	  reader	  in	  religious	  discussions,	  specifically	  the	  discussion	  of	  Christianity.	  As	  SK’s	  approach	  to	  religion	  does	  not	  concern	  us,	  I	  will	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extricate	  his	  underlying	  message,	  which	  announces	  anxiety	  as	  the	  “pivot	  upon	  which	  everything	  turns.”	  (CA,	  32)	  Similar	  to	  Martin	  Heidegger,	  SK	  treats	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  anxiety	  as	  the	  partner	  of	  possibility:	  focus	  rests	  on	  what	  can	  be	  made	  possible	  for	  the	  individual	  in	  addition	  to	  one’s	  own	  most	  possibility.	  “Anxiety	  as	  the	  Presupposition	  of	  Hereditary	  Sin	  and	  As	  Explaining	  Hereditary	  Sin	  Retrogressively	  in	  Terms	  of	  Its	  Origins”	  works	  to	  reveal	  the	  explicit	  relationship	  between	  anxiety	  and	  possibility.	  Possibility	  stands	  in	  opposition	  to	  actuality:	  this	  will	  serve	  as	  the	  preliminary	  and	  perhaps	  more	  important	  investigation	  in	  this	  strangely	  complex	  text.	  	  
	   Freedom	  lies	  at	  the	  foundation	  of	  Jean-­‐Paul	  Sartre’s	  philosophy.	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  his	  interpretations	  of	  anxiety,	  anguish	  as	  he	  calls	  it,	  we	  must	  first	  understand	  his	  intentions	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  freedom,	  and	  the	  importance	  it	  bears	  in	  Being	  and	  Nothingness.	  Like	  Heidegger	  and	  Kierkegaard,	  Sartre	  articulates	  anxiety	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  fundamental	  project	  that	  constitutes	  existence.	  Coupled	  with	  absolute	  freedom	  is	  one’s	  responsibility	  to	  carry	  out	  freedom.	  In	  fact,	  responsibility	  is	  the	  means	  through	  which	  absolute	  freedom	  is	  moderated.	  Additionally,	  it	  channels	  the	  project	  of	  the	  individual	  toward	  authenticity,	  which	  is	  an	  essential	  way	  of	  being,	  according	  to	  Sartre.	  Being	  and	  Time	  describes	  things	  such	  as	  resoluteness,	  and	  choosing	  potentiality,	  but	  Heidegger	  neglects	  to	  articulate	  absolute	  freedom	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  our	  actions.	  Sartre	  brings	  to	  the	  forefront	  one’s	  harsh	  confrontation	  with	  the	  realization	  of	  freedom,	  as	  it	  is	  manifest	  in	  anguish.	  He	  writes,	  “In	  anguish	  I	  apprehend	  myself	  at	  once	  as	  totally	  free	  and	  as	  not	  being	  able	  to	  derive	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  world	  except	  as	  coming	  from	  myself.”	  (EE,	  40)	  As	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Part	  One	  	  I.	  What	  is	  Dasein?	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  project	  of	  Dasein,	  we	  must	  first	  understand	  Dasein	  at	  its	  most	  fundamental	  level.	  Martin	  Heidegger	  writes,	  “Dasein	  is	  my	  own,	  to	  be	  always	  in	  this	  or	  that	  way.	  It	  has	  somehow	  always	  already	  decided	  in	  which	  way	  Dasein	  is	  always	  my	  own.	  The	  being	  which	  is	  concerned	  in	  its	  being	  about	  its	  being	  is	  related	  to	  its	  being	  as	  its	  ownmost	  possibility.	  Dasein	  is	  always	  its	  possibility.”	  (BT,	  42)	  	  Firstly,	  Dasein	  is	  “I”;	  it	  is	  constituted	  by	  existence	  and	  defined	  by	  possibility.	  It	  is	  being.	  It	  is	  the	  very	  ground	  from	  which	  Dasein	  itself	  moves	  forward	  and	  upward.	  To	  say	  Dasein	  is	  its	  possibility	  is	  to	  place	  nearly	  all	  focus	  onto	  possibility.	  Dasein	  is	  not,	  without	  the	  existence	  of	  possibility,	  for	  possibility	  is	  defining	  of	  all	  things	  from	  this	  moment	  onward.	  As	  my	  fingers	  move	  across	  this	  keyboard,	  each	  second	  becomes	  a	  second	  passed,	  and	  though	  passed,	  I	  once	  possessed	  the	  opportunity	  to	  type.	  In	  this	  particular	  instance,	  I	  seized	  the	  possibility	  that	  was	  my	  ownmost.	  Importantly,	  the	  only	  possibility	  that	  exists	  is	  that	  which	  Dasein	  has	  conceived	  of.	  In	  this	  way,	  possibility	  has	  become	  Dasein’s	  ownmost,	  Possibility,	  as	  it	  stands	  as	  Dasein’s	  possibility,	  is	  the	  only	  means	  through	  which	  Dasein	  can	  conceive	  of	  itself.	  In	  the	  very	  act	  of	  contemplating	  it’s	  being,	  Dasein	  self	  fulfills.	  The	  possibility	  of	  its	  being	  is	  further	  enlivened	  by	  the	  carrying	  out,	  or	  seizing,	  of	  possibility.	  	  	  	   Additionally,	  Dasein	  is	  not	  an	  abstract	  entity,	  to	  the	  likes	  of	  a	  soul,	  which	  may	  be	  viewed	  in	  abstraction	  or	  placed	  in	  a	  realm	  other	  than	  “here”.	  Dasein	  has	  a	  home,	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namely	  the	  world,	  which	  enables	  its	  concretized	  situation.	  As	  a	  being-­‐in-­‐the	  world,	  Dasein	  gives	  life	  and	  meaning	  to	  its	  surroundings.	  Or,	  world,	  as	  an	  infinite	  collection	  of	  settings,	  contexts	  is	  that	  which	  is	  made	  sense	  of	  by	  Dasein.	  World	  here	  is	  not	  described	  in	  objective	  terms,	  rather	  it	  becomes	  subjective	  to	  Dasein.	  As	  a	  characteristic	  of	  Dasein,	  world	  is	  necessarily	  included	  in	  its	  definition,	  for	  it	  is	  the	  very	  place	  in	  which	  Dasein	  dwells.	  Dwelling,	  which	  Heidegger	  describes	  fully	  in	  his	  text,	  Poetry,	  Language,	  Thought,	  is	  the	  position	  of	  human	  beings,	  of	  Dasein.	  As	  beings,	  we	  are	  always	  already	  in	  the	  world,	  in	  the	  most	  situated	  of	  ways.	  We	  are	  connected	  with	  world	  as	  we	  allot	  it	  meaning.	  	  	   If	  Dasein	  is	  its	  ownmost	  possibility,	  how	  do	  we	  begin	  to	  define	  possibility	  in	  narrower	  terms?	  It	  cannot	  be	  the	  case	  that	  possibility	  includes	  all	  that	  is,	  for	  this	  is	  actuality	  in	  reality.	  Possibility	  is	  the	  defining	  characteristic	  of	  all	  that	  floats	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  future.	  If	  Dasein	  can	  think	  it,	  it	  is	  a	  possibility.	  Possibility	  here	  does	  not	  include	  notions	  of	  likelihood.	  Throughout	  this	  essay,	  possibility	  with	  regard	  to	  Dasein’s	  project,	  describes	  the	  very	  invention	  of	  possibility.	  As	  I	  conceive	  of	  the	  
possibility	  of	  possibilities,	  I	  am	  quintessentially	  Dasein.	  	   In	  the	  instance	  that	  Dasein	  seizes	  its	  ownmost	  possibility,	  it	  has	  reinforced	  itself	  as	  Dasein.	  Defined	  as	  a	  being	  that	  is	  possibility,	  Dasein	  is	  now	  two	  things:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  possibility;	  on	  the	  other,	  it	  is	  simply	  possibility.	  In	  the	  act	  of	  seizure,	  Dasein	  takes	  powerful	  claim	  over	  that	  which	  stands	  to	  be	  seized.	  It	  is	  the	  act	  of	  seizing	  which	  transforms	  that	  which	  was	  possible,	  to	  that	  which	  is	  now	  actual.	  This	  does	  not	  mean,	  however,	  that	  that	  which	  was	  possible	  has	  now	  ‘come	  true’	  in	  some	  manner.	  Seized	  possibility	  instead	  refers	  to	  the	  deliberate	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actions	  of	  the	  individual,	  in	  response	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  possibility.	  To	  seize	  possibility	  is	  to	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  anxiety.	  According	  to	  Heidegger,	  seizing	  is	  neither	  seen	  as	  an	  ethical	  responsibility	  nor	  a	  privilege.	  Rather,	  the	  desire	  to	  seize	  is	  evoked	  in	  the	  individual	  who	  actively	  chooses	  to	  advance	  his	  position	  in	  the	  world-­‐	  to	  do	  so	  is	  precisely	  the	  project	  of	  the	  human	  being.	  	  	  II.	  What	  is	  Dasein’s	  project?	  	  	   In	  the	  beginning	  pages	  of	  this	  essay	  it	  is	  mentioned,	  anxiety	  congruously	  
works	  alongside	  the	  project	  of	  the	  human	  being.	  This	  is	  to	  say,	  anxiety	  aids	  in	  the	  
already	  happening	  process	  of	  one’s	  advancement	  through	  space	  and	  time.	  Discussion	  of	  anxiety	  will	  be	  temporarily	  abandoned	  as	  I	  work	  to	  define	  what	  I	  mean	  when	  I	  say	  ‘the	  already	  happening	  process	  of	  one’s	  advancement	  through	  space	  and	  time.’	  As	  Dasein	  exists,	  it	  organically	  travels	  through	  life,	  molding	  itself	  and	  those	  around	  it.	  The	  slow	  forward	  movement	  that	  is	  life	  pushes	  the	  human	  being	  from	  behind,	  and	  the	  being	  lives.	  She	  necessarily	  has	  experiences,	  if	  experience	  is	  defined	  by	  inadvertent	  encounters	  with	  the	  world.	  	  Let	  us	  paint	  the	  picture	  of	  progression	  as	  that	  which	  moves	  toward	  something.	  In	  the	  already	  happening	  movement	  of	  life,	  we	  are	  always	  moving	  toward	  our	  own	  end.	  	  	  	   This	  natural	  advancement	  through	  space	  and	  time,	  namely	  living,	  can	  be	  coupled	  with	  another	  type	  of	  movement,	  if	  the	  individual	  so	  chooses-­‐	  or,	  rather,	  if	  the	  possibility	  in	  question	  is	  seized.	  This	  kind	  of	  movement	  is	  called	  anxiety.	  To	  say	  anxiety	  aids	  in	  an	  already	  happening	  process	  is	  to	  assert	  the	  propelling	  nature	  of	  anxiety.	  Movement	  in	  its	  metaphorical	  sense	  becomes	  a	  constituent	  of	  Dasein	  for	  it	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III.	  The	  Private	  Sphere	  	   Heidegger	  ascribes	  the	  term	  authentic	  to	  Dasein	  insofar	  as	  Dasein	  has	  applied	  the	  fundamental	  principle	  of	  anxiety	  to	  its	  being.	  We	  ask	  now,	  what	  is	  this	  fundamental	  principle?	  –To	  live	  in	  accordance	  with	  authenticity.	  In	  order	  for	  one’s	  existence	  to	  fall	  into	  the	  category	  authentic,	  one	  must	  exist	  independently	  from	  foreign	  aspirations	  and	  pressures,	  cast	  upon	  her	  by	  the	  inauthentic	  realm	  to	  which	  the	  ‘they’	  belongs.	  To	  best	  understand	  the	  ‘they’,	  we	  refer	  to	  the	  following	  cliché:	  “You	  know	  what	  they	  say…”	  Who	  exactly	  is	  this	  ‘they’	  society	  incessantly	  mentions?	  
Who	  says	  it’s	  going	  to	  rain?	  They	  says	  it’s	  going	  to	  rain,	  therefore	  it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that	  it	  is	  going	  to	  rain.	  Why-­‐	  because	  they	  said	  so.	  ‘They’	  refers	  to	  the	  blend	  of	  everyone	  that	  stands	  in	  opposition	  to	  I.	  	  As	  ‘I’	  exists	  as	  the	  representation	  of	  individuality,	  ‘they’	  is	  a	  sum	  of	  persons	  whose	  identity	  has	  been	  stripped	  and	  replaced	  by	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  collective.	  In	  the	  ‘they’,	  there	  does	  not	  exist	  an	  individual	  who	  executes	  personal	  goals.	  One	  cannot	  find	  someone	  who	  thinks	  or	  acts	  for	  his	  or	  herself.	  Rather,	  one	  thinks	  and	  acts	  based	  on	  the	  expected	  thinking	  and	  acting	  facilitated	  by	  an	  imposed	  normalcy.	  In	  contrast,	  authenticity	  is	  a	  realm	  of	  selfishness,	  for	  it	  is	  in	  this	  realm	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  possibility	  exists.	  In	  effort	  to	  elucidate:	  that	  which	  is	  selfish	  is	  that	  which	  propels	  you	  forward	  and	  alone.	  Anxiety	  itself	  is	  necessarily	  selfish	  for	  it	  propels	  us	  forward	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  gain	  a	  greater	  perspective	  of	  our	  selves	  and	  our	  world.	  To	  have	  anxiety	  about	  possibility	  is	  to	  have	  awareness	  of	  the	  endless	  array	  of	  possibilities,	  and	  this	  is	  most	  selfish	  of	  all.	  Kierkegaard	  writes,	  “But	  anxiety	  is	  of	  all	  things	  the	  most	  selfish,	  and	  no	  concrete	  expression	  of	  freedom	  is	  as	  selfish	  as	  the	  possibility	  of	  every	  concretion…In	  anxiety	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there	  is	  the	  selfish	  infinity	  of	  possibility,	  which	  does	  not	  tempt	  like	  a	  choice	  but	  ensnaringly	  disquiets	  with	  its	  sweet	  anxiousness.”	  (CA,	  61)	  ***	  	  	  	  “In	  anxiety,	  the	  things	  at	  hand	  in	  the	  surrounding	  world	  sink	  away,	  and	  so	  do	  the	  innerwordly	  beings	  in	  general.	  The	  “world”	  can	  offer	  nothing	  more,	  nor	  can	  the	  Dasein-­‐with	  of	  others.	  Thus	  anxiety	  takes	  away	  from	  Dasein	  the	  possibility	  of	  understanding	  itself,	  falling	  prey,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  “world”	  and	  the	  public	  way	  of	  being	  interpreted.”	  (BT,	  181)	  	  Heidegger	  uses	  the	  preposition	  in,	  alluding	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  place	  into	  which	  anxiety	  falls.	  As	  a	  state	  of	  being,	  anxiety	  has	  abstract	  location	  and	  borders.	  The	  ‘they’	  does	  not	  live	  within	  these	  borders,	  rather	  ‘I’	  does.	  ‘They’	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  sweeping	  Other;	  it	  is	  everyone	  else,	  and	  their	  place	  is	  the	  ambiguous	  world.	  The	  sweeping	  Other	  is	  indicative	  of	  a	  single	  unit	  of	  normalcy,	  out	  of	  which	  ‘they’	  prey	  on	  and	  reel	  in	  ‘I’.	  In	  anxiety,	  which	  Heidegger	  differentiates	  from	  world,	  the	  world	  ‘can	  offer	  nothing	  more’-­‐	  that	  which	  is	  being	  offered	  is	  meaning,	  tainted	  by	  an	  inauthentic	  context,	  comprised	  of	  what	  ‘they’	  purposefully	  maintain	  and	  provide-­‐	  familiarity.	  When	  Heidegger	  discusses	  “the	  public	  way	  of	  being	  interpreted”,	  he	  is	  referring	  to	  a	  tainted	  interpretation,	  which	  aims	  to	  hinder	  Dasein’s	  ownmost	  possibility	  of	  individuality.	  Therefore,	  when	  it	  is	  stated	  that	  Dasein	  is	  unable	  to	  understand	  itself	  in	  anxiety	  “in	  terms	  of	  the	  ‘world’”	  it	  is	  not	  to	  be	  stated	  that	  Dasein	  is	  not	  able	  to	  understand	  itself.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  to	  say	  that	  Dasein	  is	  unable	  to	  use	  world	  as	  means	  of	  reference….	  a	  new	  understanding	  of	  Dasein	  must	  therefore	  be	  formulated	  and	  this	  understanding	  is	  the	  understanding	  of	  possibility.	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   The	  notion	  of	  falling	  prey	  is	  that	  which	  threatens	  to	  permeate	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  private	  sphere.	  We	  ask,	  who	  is	  falling	  prey	  and	  to	  what	  imminent	  danger?	  It	  is	  the	  ‘I’	  that	  falls	  prey	  to	  the	  influential	  ‘they’.	  As	  Dasein	  falls	  prey,	  it	  simultaneously	  renders	  itself	  as	  a	  non-­‐anxious	  being.	  Dasein	  has	  actively	  chosen	  the	  path	  of	  complacency	  in	  the	  process	  of	  actively	  dismissing	  progression.	  Familiarity	  takes	  priority.	  For	  it	  is	  certainly	  easier	  to	  join	  the	  majority-­‐	  decisions	  are	  premade,	  judgments	  and	  emotions	  pre-­‐assigned.	  Best	  of	  all,	  the	  uncomfortable	  feeling	  of	  uncanniness	  dissolves	  nearly	  instantaneously.	  Uncanniness	  is	  that	  which	  makes	  the	  endurance	  of	  anxiety	  most	  difficult.	  It	  articulates	  the	  puzzling	  occurrences	  of	  bewilderment	  that	  accompany	  moments	  of	  anxiety,	  or	  rather,	  moments	  in	  which	  the	  individual	  finds	  herself	  confronted	  with	  the	  choice	  of	  A	  or	  B.	  Her	  very	  ground	  is	  located	  in	  the	  space	  between	  A	  and	  B-­‐	  here	  in	  lies	  the	  origin	  of	  uncanniness.	  A	  and	  B	  are	  representative	  of	  situatedness,	  and	  between	  them	  exists	  a	  gap.	  As	  humans,	  we	  are	  naturally	  always	  in	  the	  world;	  we	  are	  beings-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	  The	  familiar	  settings	  which	  constitute	  the	  world,	  our	  home,	  	  provide	  us	  comfort.	  The	  experience	  of	  uncanniness	  is	  marked	  by	  our	  realization	  of	  not-­‐being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	  The	  ‘they’	  summons	  to	  Dasein,	  calling	  Dasein	  to	  join	  it	  in	  comfort.	  Feeling	  uncanny	  provides	  Dasein	  with	  the	  urgency	  to	  move	  in	  one	  direction	  or	  the	  other;	  to	  join	  the	  ‘they’	  or	  to	  seize	  the	  possibility	  of	  possibility,	  namely	  to	  live	  as	  an	  individual.	  Here	  again,	  we	  sense	  the	  particular	  type	  of	  movement	  inherent	  in	  anxiety	  as	  it	  acts	  as	  a	  motivating	  force.	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   For	  Søren	  Kierkegaard,	  the	  ambiguous	  ground	  between	  situations	  A	  and	  B	  is	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  Qualitative	  Leap.	  The	  Concept	  of	  Anxiety	  describes	  the	  Qualitative	  Leap	  under	  a	  religious	  lens.	  As	  religion	  does	  not	  concern	  our	  discussion,	  I	  will	  describe	  the	  leap	  as	  it	  pertains	  to	  philosophy	  only.	  Most	  abstractly,	  the	  leap	  describes	  movement	  that	  closes	  the	  gap.	  We	  see	  evidence	  of	  the	  gap	  as	  it	  exists	  between	  possibility	  and	  actuality.	  It	  is	  in	  Kierkegaard’s	  view	  that	  man,	  as	  he	  exists	  in	  innocence,	  is	  constituted	  by	  his	  possibility	  to	  become	  actual.	  As	  possibility	  and	  actuality	  are	  marked	  as	  points	  along	  a	  linear	  path,	  there	  lies	  between	  them	  an	  ambiguous	  realm.	  If	  the	  goal	  is	  for	  possibility	  to	  morph	  into	  actuality,	  how	  is	  this	  process	  brought	  about?	  Who	  or	  what	  instigates	  the	  progression,	  the	  movement,	  or	  perhaps	  the	  exchange?	  	  	  	   Anxiety,	  translated	  in	  The	  Concept	  of	  Anxiety	  as	  dread,	  shrinks	  the	  ambiguous	  space	  between	  possibility	  and	  actuality,	  bringing	  the	  two	  ends	  closer	  toward	  one	  another,	  enabling	  the	  individual’s	  transition	  between	  them.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  ambiguous	  space	  which	  anxiety	  shrinks	  is	  itself	  anxiety.	  Here,	  possibility	  describes	  a	  sort	  of	  abstraction	  in	  which	  the	  ultimate	  end	  is	  concretization.	  To	  claim	  anxiety	  as	  the	  ‘driving	  force	  necessary	  to	  commit	  man’	  is	  to	  prioritize	  the	  commitment.	  This	  commitment	  is	  the	  concretization	  of	  one’s	  pursuit	  of	  progression.	  Possibility	  becomes	  actuality,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  possibilities	  are	  actualized.	  In	  an	  abstract	  sense,	  possibilities	  float	  on	  the	  periphery	  as	  ethereal	  what	  ifs.	  What	  is	  described	  here	  is	  not	  the	  abolition	  of	  possibility,	  rather	  the	  actualization	  of	  possibilities.	  In	  essence,	  the	  actualization	  of	  possibilities	  comes	  to	  us	  via	  anxiety,	  for	  it	  forces	  the	  leap.	  As	  the	  middle	  ground	  between	  possibility	  (A)	  and	  actuality	  (B),	  anxiety	  necessarily	  forces	  
	  	  
	  	  18	  
the	  individual	  in	  question	  to	  seize	  his	  own	  most	  possibility,	  and	  force	  it	  into	  his	  reality.	  In	  this	  sense,	  possibility	  and	  actuality	  are	  one	  in	  the	  same.	  This	  is	  the	  very	  notion	  that	  the	  anxious	  person	  is	  anxious	  about-­‐	  the	  reality	  of	  endless	  possibility,	  unfolding	  onto	  one	  another,	  culminating	  in	  an	  assault	  on	  his	  existence.	  “…Dasein	  exists	  as	  a	  whole	  assembly	  of	  possibilities	  for	  being	  in	  the	  world	  and	  that	  in	  any	  given	  moment	  it	  may	  “carry	  out”	  only	  one	  of	  these	  while	  each	  of	  the	  others	  remain	  simply	  “uncarried	  out”.”	  (Boss,	  Recent	  Considerations	  in	  Daseinanalysis)	  	  	  
	   At	  this	  time,	  the	  following	  question	  arises:	  what	  is	  the	  difference,	  if	  any,	  between	  A.	  Living	  an	  authentic	  life	  and	  B.	  Living	  a	  life	  of	  authentic	  possibility?	  It	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  living	  an	  authentic	  life	  is	  to	  live	  a	  life	  that	  is	  constituted	  by	  the	  recurrence	  of	  authentic	  possibilities.	  To	  live	  an	  authentic	  life	  is	  to	  live	  a	  life	  completely	  void	  of	  influence	  from	  the	  inauthentic.	  It	  is	  to	  say,	  there	  does	  not	  exist	  a	  moment	  in	  which	  the	  powerful,	  inauthentic	  ‘they’	  inhabits	  Dasein’s	  sphere.	  To	  live	  an	  authentic	  life	  is	  to	  never	  fall	  prey	  to	  the	  public	  sphere.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  to	  live	  a	  life	  of	  authentic	  possibility	  is	  to	  live	  a	  life	  in	  which	  one	  moves	  between	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sphere.	  Unlike	  a	  purely	  authentic	  existence,	  time	  is	  split	  between	  authentic	  being,	  provoked	  by	  moments	  of	  choice.	  Such	  a	  choice	  is	  the	  choice	  between	  possibility	  itself,	  and	  the	  complacency	  constituted	  by	  inauthenticity.	  	  	   As	  I	  consider	  my	  own	  existence,	  I	  consider	  it	  as	  one	  of	  authentic	  possibility	  for	  I	  am	  constantly	  confronted	  by	  the	  choice	  which	  anxiety	  sets	  before	  me,	  but	  only	  sometimes	  do	  I	  seize	  my	  own	  possibility.	  Søren	  Kierkegaard	  writes,	  “…whoever	  is	  educated	  (by	  possibility)	  remains	  with	  anxiety;	  he	  does	  not	  permit	  himself	  to	  be	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deceived	  by	  its	  countless	  falsifications	  and	  accurately	  remembers	  the	  past”.	  (CA,	  159)	  In	  other	  words,	  he	  who	  understands	  the	  possibility	  manifest	  in	  anxiety	  knows	  not	  to	  deny	  anxiety.	  It	  is	  a	  personal	  goal	  to	  ‘accurately	  remember	  the	  past’,	  which	  describes	  moments	  of	  anxiety	  and	  the	  path	  onto	  which	  one	  is	  lead	  upon	  seizing	  possibility.	  	  We	  will	  get	  a	  better	  sense	  of	  this	  notion	  of	  ‘accurately	  remembering’	  in	  Part	  Two.	  	  
	   Resoluteness	  	   The	  choosing	  of	  our	  own	  most	  potentiality-­‐	  namely	  choice-­‐	  is	  what	  Heidegger	  calls	  resoluteness.	  “Understanding	  the	  summons	  reveals	  itself	  as	  wanting	  to	  have	  a	  
conscience.	  But	  in	  this	  phenomenon	  lies	  that	  existentiell	  choosing	  of	  the	  choice	  of	  being-­‐a-­‐self	  which	  we	  are	  looking	  for	  and	  which	  we	  call	  resoluteness…”	  (BT,	  260)	  In	  resoluteness,	  I	  authentically	  choose	  to	  choose.	  I	  accept	  the	  risk	  associated	  with	  abandoning	  the	  ‘they’	  as	  I	  move	  forward	  into	  the	  ‘I’.	  What	  is	  at	  risk	  in	  resoluteness?	  It	  is	  the	  support	  offered	  by	  the	  ‘they’.	  This	  support	  is	  in	  essence	  an	  affirmation	  of	  my	  rejection	  of	  individualization,	  of	  (my)	  self.	  “Entangled	  flight	  into	  the	  being-­‐at-­‐home	  of	  publicness	  is	  flight	  from	  not-­‐being-­‐at-­‐home,	  that	  is,	  from	  the	  uncanniness	  which	  lies	  in	  Dasein	  as	  thrown,	  as	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  entrusted	  to	  itself	  in	  its	  being.”	  (BT,	  183)	  Publicness	  is	  at	  the	  base	  of	  the	  ‘they’,	  and	  when	  I	  accept	  the	  risk	  presented	  to	  me	  by	  resoluteness,	  I	  am	  in	  turn	  transitioning	  from	  publicness	  to	  privateness	  where	  any	  additional	  risks	  are	  only	  my	  own	  to	  assess	  and	  take	  on.	  What,	  then,	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  choose	  to	  not	  to	  choose,	  or	  rather,	  to	  ignore	  choice	  in	  pursuit	  of	  the	  ‘they’?	  If	  I	  am	  choosing	  not	  to	  choose,	  am	  I	  rendering	  myself	  no	  choices	  at	  all	  and	  thus	  the	  word	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‘choice’	  becomes	  irrelevant?	  It	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  Heidegger	  would	  deem	  “choosing	  the	  ‘they’”	  impossible.	  Instead,	  by	  ignoring	  the	  call	  of	  our	  conscience,	  we	  automatically	  fall	  into	  the	  ‘they’;	  it	  is	  not	  a	  choice.	  We	  do	  not	  choose	  the	  ‘they’,	  rather	  we	  are	  subject	  to	  it	  unless	  we	  choose	  to	  hear	  the	  call	  of	  our	  conscience.	  We	  are	  always	  already	  fallen.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  ‘they’	  does	  not	  make	  choices	  because	  indeed	  they	  do.	  But	  as	  a	  part	  of	  the	  ‘they’,	  I	  do	  not	  choose-­‐	  I	  go	  along	  with	  the	  choices	  other	  have	  made.	  For	  how	  could	  it	  be	  the	  case	  that	  I	  choose	  if	  I	  am	  not	  an	  ‘I’	  among	  the	  ‘they’;	  I	  am	  ‘they’	  and	  nothing	  more.	  Resoluteness	  pertains	  to	  
authentically	  choosing	  to	  choose,	  which	  again	  reveals	  the	  necessary	  notion	  of	  individuality.	  	  	  IV.	  The	  Other	  	  	   “Such	  then	  is	  the	  totality	  of	  processes	  by	  which	  we	  try	  to	  hide	  anguish	  from	  ourselves;	  we	  apprehend	  our	  particular	  possible	  by	  avoiding	  considering	  all	  other	  possibles,	  which	  we	  make	  the	  possibles	  of	  an	  undifferentiated	  Other.”	  (BN,	  43)	  The	  Other	  is	  that	  which	  occupies	  the	  public	  sphere,	  representative	  of	  inauthentic	  existence.	  Insofar	  as	  Dasein	  is	  authentic,	  I	  is	  authentic,	  therefore	  the	  Other	  stands	  in	  opposition.	  But	  how	  does	  the	  self	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  Other?	  What	  role	  does	  the	  Other	  play	  in	  the	  life	  of	  the	  self?	  Can	  one	  be	  in	  anxiety	  amidst	  the	  Other(s)?	  According	  to	  Sartre,	  and	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  anxiety,	  the	  Other	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  means	  of	  escape.	  What	  does	  this	  mean?	  By	  conceiving	  of	  the	  Other	  as	  ‘over	  there’	  and	  the	  self	  as	  ‘here’,	  the	  individual	  is	  able	  to	  mentally	  transpose	  her	  own	  most	  potentiality	  onto	  the	  Other.	  Who	  this	  other	  is,	  we	  do	  not	  know	  nor	  does	  it	  matter.	  In	  anxiety,	  my	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immediate	  inclination	  is	  to	  assign	  that	  which	  is	  possible	  for	  me,	  to	  someone	  else	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  abandon	  my	  possibilities.	  I	  want	  the	  possibility	  of	  nothing.	  	  	   The	  Other	  becomes	  the	  object	  of	  one’s	  flight	  in	  a	  twofold	  manner:	  the	  subject	  flees	  from	  anxiety	  by	  ascribing	  the	  Other	  as	  her	  means,	  and	  the	  subject	  flees	  toward	  the	  Other	  in	  search	  of	  what	  Heidegger	  calls	  “tranquilized	  familiarity”.	  	  The	  role	  of	  the	  Other,	  however,	  is	  not	  a	  passive	  one.	  Thinkers	  such	  as	  Jean-­‐Paul	  Sartre	  and	  Maurice	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  have	  examined	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  gaze,	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  helps	  us	  understand	  the	  power	  the	  Other	  as	  it	  objectifies	  the	  self.	  The	  gaze,	  or	  the	  look	  as	  Sartre	  calls	  it	  in	  Being	  and	  Nothingness,	  describes	  the	  relationship	  between	  he	  who	  gazes	  and	  she	  who	  receives	  the	  gaze.	  In	  the	  process	  of	  perceiving	  the	  Other,	  the	  gazer	  turns	  the	  individual	  into	  an	  object	  he	  can	  examine.	  The	  Other	  becomes	  void	  of	  personality	  and	  is	  instead	  viewed	  merely	  as	  a	  representation	  of	  something.	  He	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  conveys	  to	  his	  object	  of	  perception,	  I	  am	  looking	  
at	  you.	  She	  who	  receives	  the	  gaze	  is	  made	  aware	  of	  her	  gazer.	  A	  sense	  of	  self-­‐awareness	  and	  self-­‐consciousness	  emerges	  as	  she	  realizes	  her	  presence	  in-­‐the-­‐world,	  and	  herself	  as	  an	  object.	  She	  receives	  his	  message,	  I	  am	  looking	  at	  you,	  and	  internalizes	  it,	  he	  is	  looking	  at	  me.	  She	  assumes	  his	  perspective	  and	  begins	  to	  see	  herself	  from	  somewhere	  outside	  of	  herself.	  In	  this	  way,	  she	  objectifies	  herself.	  Next,	  her	  gaze	  turns	  towards	  him.	  She	  becomes	  the	  I	  and	  he	  becomes	  the	  Other.	  The	  two	  are	  involved	  in	  a	  relationship	  of	  objectification,	  as	  they	  simultaneously	  perceive	  one	  another’s	  existence.	  The	  objectification	  of	  the	  Other	  is	  furthered	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  temporality.	  Because	  we	  can	  only	  conceive	  of	  forward	  movement	  in	  terms	  of	  our	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own	  fundamental	  project,	  the	  Other	  does	  not	  embody	  a	  sense	  of	  time	  for	  us,	  and	  is	  therefore	  not	  representative	  of	  something	  that	  is	  analogous	  to	  ‘me’.	  	   Let	  us	  then	  examine	  shame	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  Other.	  My	  assumption	  is	  that	  the	  Other,	  an	  embodiment	  of	  the	  ‘they’,	  lives	  by	  a	  strict	  code	  of	  normalcy,	  imposed	  upon	  him	  by	  the	  public	  sphere.	  He	  will	  most	  certainly	  understand	  my	  behavior	  to	  which	  he	  is	  witness	  as	  bizarre,	  uncanny.	  In	  expressing	  anxiety,	  I	  demonstrate	  behavior	  particular	  to	  my	  self,	  and	  I	  am	  embarrassed.	  Shame	  is	  precisely	  the	  phenomenon	  that	  fuels	  the	  silence	  of	  anxiety.	  In	  anxiety,	  my	  behavior	  is	  necessarily	  particular	  to	  my	  self	  because	  I	  am	  alone;	  I	  am	  undergoing	  the	  process	  of	  individualization;	  the	  world	  offers	  no	  help;	  nothing	  holds	  meaning,	  and	  certainly	  not	  the	  objectified	  Other	  in	  my	  presence.	  Imagine	  what	  the	  Other	  would	  think	  if	  they	  knew	  of	  this	  experience?	  Surely,	  they	  have	  never	  experienced	  this	  before,	  because	  this	  is	  strange.	  And	  the	  Other	  is	  not	  strange,	  the	  other	  is	  an	  archetype	  for	  normalcy.	  I	  can’t	  lead	  on	  to	  what’s	  happening;	  I	  must	  stay	  silent	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  fool	  the	  Other	  into	  thinking	  I	  am	  balanced	  and	  predictable.	  I	  must	  blend	  in	  with	  familiarity.	  In	  silence,	  my	  anxiety	  festers.	  I	  have	  neither	  seized	  my	  potentiality,	  nor	  am	  I	  fallen.	  I	  am	  stuck	  in	  the	  ambiguous	  intermediary	  between	  two	  distinct	  kinds	  of	  relief.	  I	  begin	  to	  consider	  endless,	  abstract	  possibilities.	  The	  terrible	  potentiality	  of	  unending	  freedom	  shortens	  my	  breath,	  and	  I	  succumb	  to	  the	  ‘they’,	  overwhelmed.	  	  	  “The	  hypochondriac	  is	  anxious	  about	  every	  insignificant	  thing,	  but	  when	  the	  significant	  appears	  he	  begins	  to	  breathe	  more	  easily…Because	  the	  significant	  actuality	  is	  after	  all	  not	  so	  terrible	  as	  the	  possibility	  he	  himself	  had	  fashioned,	  and	  which	  he	  used	  his	  strength	  to	  fashion,	  where	  as	  he	  can	  now	  use	  all	  his	  strength	  against	  actuality.”	  (CA,	  162)	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It	  is	  necessarily	  the	  case	  that	  the	  hypochondriac	  is	  anxious	  about	  death.	  Let	  us	  say	  for	  example	  that	  he	  is	  particularly	  anxious	  about	  a	  pain	  in	  his	  hand	  leading	  to	  death.	  Because	  the	  individual	  cannot	  find	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  pain,	  the	  pain	  is	  mysterious.	  The	  mysterious	  pain	  leads	  him	  to	  consider	  irrational	  possibilities.	  Instability	  lay	  at	  the	  foundation	  of	  his	  considerations.	  As	  he	  considers	  more	  potential	  reasons	  for	  why	  his	  hand	  hurts,	  he	  simultaneously	  considers	  all	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  pain	  could	  exacerbate	  and	  ultimately	  lead	  to	  his	  demise.	  Without	  the	  answers	  that	  provide	  security	  and	  concretion,	  the	  hypochondriac	  tortures	  himself	  with	  an	  endless	  stream	  of	  questioning.	  Suddenly,	  he	  remembers	  burning	  his	  hand	  on	  a	  hot	  plate	  the	  previous	  evening.	  This	  is	  his	  actuality.	  As	  he	  remembers	  the	  events	  from	  the	  night	  before,	  he	  brings	  his	  irrational	  stream	  of	  contemplation	  to	  a	  halt,	  and	  provides	  it	  with	  the	  firm	  ground	  of	  actuality.	  He	  is	  no	  longer	  anxious,	  because	  he	  has	  answers.	  He	  has	  found	  a	  reason	  for	  the	  pain.	  The	  meaning	  of	  the	  world	  seemed	  to	  whither	  away	  in	  his	  efforts	  to	  find	  answers	  among	  insignificant	  possibilities.	  The	  meaningless	  world	  in	  which	  the	  anxious	  individual	  finds	  himself	  in	  only	  furthers	  confusion	  and	  nonsensical	  rationales.	  It	  is	  self	  perpetuating.	  	  “…	  Unfreedom	  becomes	  more	  and	  more	  inclosed	  and	  does	  not	  want	  communication…It	  manifests	  itself	  in	  hypochondria,	  in	  capriciousness;	  it	  manifests	  itself	  in	  the	  highest	  passions,	  when	  in	  a	  profound	  misunderstanding	  they	  introduce	  the	  silent	  treatment.”	  (CA,	  124)	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Part	  Two	  	  	  “The	  elaboration	  of	  this	  fundamental	  kind	  of	  attunement	  and	  the	  ontological	  characteristics	  of	  what	  is	  disclosed	  in	  it	  as	  such	  take	  their	  point	  of	  departure	  from	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  entanglement,	  and	  distinguish	  anxiety	  from	  the	  related	  phenomenon	  of	  fear	  analyzed	  earlier.	  As	  a	  possibility	  of	  being	  of	  Dasein,	  together	  with	  the	  Dasein	  itself	  disclosed	  in	  it,	  anxiety	  provides	  the	  phenomenal	  basis	  for	  explicitly	  grasping	  the	  primordial	  totality	  of	  being	  of	  Dasein.”	  (BT,	  177)	  	  
	   	  
	   Being	  and	  Time,	  The	  Concept	  of	  Anxiety,	  and	  Being	  and	  Nothingness	  each	  describe	  the	  way	  in	  which	  anxiety	  serves	  as	  one’s	  way	  of	  relating	  to	  the	  world.	  Just	  as	  Maurice	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  views	  human	  sexuality	  as	  the	  form	  of	  expression	  through	  which	  one	  demonstrates	  his	  or	  her	  aliveness,	  the	  three	  philosophers	  discussed	  in	  this	  essay	  view	  anxiety	  as	  a	  quintessential	  mode	  of	  being.	  We	  refer	  to	  the	  Ancient	  Greek	  philosopher,	  Heraclitus,	  to	  best	  understand	  the	  meaning	  of	  attunement,	  before	  understanding	  anxiety	  as	  Dasein’s	  way	  of	  being.	  It	  is	  under	  Heraclitus’	  view	  that	  the	  world	  has	  a	  way,	  and	  it	  is	  human	  responsibility	  to	  listen	  to	  this	  way	  and	  consequently	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  it.	  The	  call	  of	  consciousness,	  mentioned	  in	  Chapter	  One,	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  conception	  of	  attunement.	  With	  respect	  to	  anxiety,	  it	  is	  Dasein’s	  responsibility	  to	  hear	  the	  call	  that	  brings	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  authenticity.	  To	  listen,	  to	  hear	  the	  call,	  is	  to	  align	  one’s	  self	  with	  the	  way	  of	  the	  world.	  Anxiety	  aids	  in	  this	  alignment.	  Here,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  make	  the	  important	  distinction	  between	  anxiety	  and	  fear.	  While	  fear	  is	  concrete,	  it	  does	  not	  possess	  the	  profound	  ability	  to	  enlighten.	  The	  concept	  of	  attunement	  enables	  the	  bridging	  between	  anxiety	  and	  one’s	  existence	  as	  a	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	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I.	  Primacy	  and	  Repetition	  	   	  	   Like	  Heidegger,	  Kierkegaard’s	  philosophy	  casts	  bright	  light	  on	  anxiety,	  revealing	  it	  as	  something	  positive.	  Let	  us	  reflect	  on	  his	  following	  claims	  from	  The	  
Concept	  of	  Anxiety:	  	  -­‐	  The	  more	  primitive	  the	  man,	  the	  more	  profound	  his	  anxiety.	  -­‐	  The	  more	  profound	  the	  anxiety,	  the	  more	  profound	  the	  culture.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  more	  primitive	  the	  man,	  the	  more	  profound	  the	  culture.	  Anxiety	  then	  becomes	  the	  tool	  with	  which	  we	  use	  to	  measure	  quality	  of	  existence.	  ‘Primitive’	  describes	  man	  as	  he	  lives	  in	  a	  pure	  world;	  world	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  shaped	  by	  others	  their	  habits,	  nor	  their	  experiences.	  Primacy	  is	  lost	  with	  the	  passing	  of	  time.	  SK	  writes,	  “Anxiety	  in	  a	  later	  individual…is	  more	  reflective	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  his	  participation	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  race-­‐	  something	  that	  can	  be	  compared	  with	  habit,	  which	  is	  something	  of	  a	  second	  nature…”	  (CA,	  53)	  Here,	  later	  individual	  describes	  he	  who	  comes	  into	  existence	  after	  Adam.	  Kierkegaard	  considers	  Adam,	  the	  archetype	  of	  primacy,	  as	  having	  the	  most	  profound	  anxiety.	  Having	  come	  into	  a	  world	  free	  from	  the	  mark	  of	  other	  existences,	  his	  anxiety	  was	  not	  produced	  by	  or	  related	  to	  pre-­‐existing	  habits.	  Instead,	  each	  occurrence	  of	  anxiety	  was	  new,	  and	  thus	  pure.	  He	  did	  not	  approach	  anxiety	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  ‘know-­‐how’,	  as	  does	  the	  ‘later’	  individual,	  the	  individual	  existing	  in	  a	  world	  less	  primal.	  Because	  his	  endurance	  of	  anxiety	  was	  not	  
explained	  to	  him,	  it	  was	  never	  made	  sense	  of.	  His	  lack	  of	  worldly	  knowledge,	  which	  would	  have	  provided	  him	  the	  knowledge	  and	  understanding	  of	  anxiety	  as	  a	  phenomenon,	  facilitated	  the	  repetition	  of	  anxiety	  as	  something	  equally	  as	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unforeseen.	  In	  a	  later	  world	  and	  amidst	  later	  individuals,	  Adam	  would	  be	  presented	  with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  find	  answers	  to	  his	  questions.	  But	  more	  likely,	  he	  was	  not	  in	  search	  of	  answers;	  he	  unconsciously	  accepted	  recurring	  anxiety	  as	  the	  experience	  of	  existence.	  And	  for	  this	  reason,	  his	  anxiety	  is	  most	  profound.	  	  	  	  	   SK’s	  assertion	  that	  the	  primitive	  man	  is	  in	  direct	  relation	  to	  the	  profoundness	  of	  a	  culture	  may	  appear	  to	  contradict	  all	  that	  we	  have	  discussed	  with	  respect	  to	  authenticity.	  How	  could	  it	  be	  that	  primacy,	  associated	  with	  things	  such	  as	  individuality	  and	  pureness,	  results	  in	  a	  more	  profound	  culture?	  As	  I	  am	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  culture	  here	  refers	  to	  a	  body	  of	  people	  with	  shared	  beliefs,	  what	  does	  it	  mean	  for	  a	  culture	  to	  be	  comprised	  of	  primitive	  men?	  It	  would	  mean	  that	  Kierkegaard	  has	  provided	  us	  with	  an	  abstract	  conceptualization	  of	  an	  authentic	  ‘they’.	  	   Heidegger,	  too,	  writes	  of	  primordial	  anxiety	  in	  Being	  and	  Time.	  He	  says,	  	  	  	  	  “The	  indefiniteness	  of	  death	  discloses	  itself	  primordially	  in	  anxiety.	  But	  this	  primordial	  anxiety	  strives	  to	  expect	  resoluteness	  of	  itself.	  	  It	  clears	  away	  every	  covering	  over	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  Dasein	  is	  itself	  left	  to	  itself.	  The	  nothingness	  before	  which	  anxiety	  brings	  us	  reveals	  the	  nullity	  that	  determines	  Dasein	  in	  its	  ground…”	  (BT,	  295)	  We	  have	  already	  asserted	  the	  meaning	  of	  resoluteness	  as	  one’s	  choosing	  to	  choose.	  To	  say	  anxiety	  strives	  to	  expect	  resoluteness	  is	  to	  assert	  the	  desire	  of	  anxiety,	  namely	  its	  desire	  to	  bypass	  the	  mediation,	  marked	  by	  uncanniness,	  and	  immediately	  proceed	  to	  assuming	  the	  role	  of	  progression.	  This	  progression,	  of	  course,	  is	  choosing	  to	  choose	  authenticity.	  We	  may	  attribute	  the	  profoundness	  of	  primordial	  anxiety	  to	  its	  being	  a	  manifestation	  of	  the	  openness	  that	  allows	  for	  the	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potentiality	  of	  choice.	  Let	  us	  explore	  this	  notion	  further.	  SK	  regards	  Adam	  as	  the	  most	  primitive,	  and	  therefore	  as	  possessing	  access	  to	  the	  most	  profound	  anxiety.	  Adam’s	  anxiety	  is	  primordial,	  for	  his	  anxiety	  is	  non-­‐habitual;	  it	  inherently	  accepts	  the	  recurring	  opportunities	  for	  resoluteness.	  By	  stating	  that	  primordial	  anxiety	  “clears	  away	  every	  covering	  over”	  is	  to	  render	  non-­‐primordial	  anxiety,	  perhaps	  SK	  would	  prefer	  “later”	  anxiety,	  as	  that	  which	  covers.	  This	  lends	  to	  anxiety	  as	  a	  misguiding	  force,	  as	  it	  covers	  the	  potentiality	  of	  anxiety	  itself.	  	  	   Jean-­‐Paul	  Sartre	  writes	  of	  repetition	  in	  a	  similar	  way.	  	  “Since	  freedom	  is	  a	  being-­‐without-­‐support	  and	  without-­‐a-­‐springboard,	  the	  project	  in	  order	  to	  be	  must	  be	  constantly	  renewed.	  I	  choose	  myself	  perpetually	  and	  can	  never	  be	  merely	  by	  virtue	  of	  having-­‐been-­‐chosen…”	  (BN,	  456)	  This	  sense	  of	  renewal	  mirrors	  Kierkegaard’s	  description	  of	  the	  primitive	  man,	  for	  the	  primitive	  man	  is	  primitive	  insofar	  as	  he	  has	  never	  been	  ‘chosen’;	  nothing	  is	  of	  a	  second	  nature;	  anxiety	  comes	  to	  him	  freely	  and	  without	  misguided	  impositions	  of	  the	  mind.	  Support,	  which	  the	  anxious	  individual	  craves,	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  antithesis	  of	  freedom	  and	  analogous	  to	  inauthenticity.	  According	  to	  Sartre,	  the	  goal	  of	  existence	  is	  authenticity,	  therefore	  we	  cannot	  rely	  on	  our	  projects	  that	  have	  been.	  Project	  is	  necessarily	  something	  that	  is	  ,	  and	  is	  something	  to	  be.	  It	  is	  to	  be	  renewed,	  and	  it	  is	  anxiety	  that	  enables	  this	  renewal.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   A	  great	  deal	  of	  anxiety’s	  power	  stems	  from	  its	  ability	  to	  revisit	  Dasein	  as	  something	  surprising.	  Or	  rather,	  Dasein	  fuels	  the	  power	  of	  anxiety	  by	  opening	  itself	  up	  to	  authentic	  possibility,	  which	  in	  turn	  enables	  anxiety	  to	  be	  presented	  as	  something	  seemingly	  new.	  The	  opening	  of	  one’s	  self	  toward	  anxiety	  is	  necessary	  in	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order	  for	  anxiety	  to	  repeat	  itself,	  otherwise	  the	  call	  to	  one’s	  consciousness	  is	  ignored	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  assuage	  uncanniness.	  Kierkegaard	  writes,	  “The	  possible	  corresponds	  exactly	  to	  the	  future…If	  I	  am	  anxious	  about	  a	  past	  misfortune,	  then	  this	  is	  not	  because	  it	  is	  in	  the	  past	  but	  because	  it	  may	  be	  repeated,	  i.e.,	  become	  future.”	  (CA,	  192)	  At	  this	  time,	  consider	  anxiety	  itself	  as	  the	  past	  misfortune	  about	  which	  Dasein	  is	  anxious.	  She	  who	  has	  not	  accepted	  anxiety	  as	  the	  constituent	  of	  her	  being	  is	  anxious	  about	  anxiety,	  specifically	  anxiety	  as	  something	  to	  be	  repeated.	  Anxiety	  becomes	  the	  agent	  which	  transcends	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  past.	  I	  am	  anxious	  about	  anxiety,	  not	  because	  it	  once	  happened,	  but	  because	  I	  never	  want	  it	  to	  happen	  again.	  For	  the	  anxious	  individual,	  it	  is	  a	  question	  of	  when	  and	  from	  where	  will	  it	  come.	  However,	  the	  pursuit	  of	  finding	  answers	  is	  an	  empty	  one,	  for	  “…what	  is	  threatening	  cannot	  come	  closer	  from	  a	  definition	  direction	  within	  nearness,	  it	  is	  already	  “there”-­‐	  and	  yet	  nowhere.	  It	  is	  so	  near	  that	  it	  is	  oppressive	  and	  takes	  away	  one’s	  breath-­‐	  and	  yet	  it	  is	  nowhere.”	  (BT,	  180)	  As	  beings-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	  that	  which	  is	  accessible	  to	  us	  by	  way	  of	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  is	  precisely	  not	  that	  which	  makes	  us	  anxious.	  Anxiety	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  ground	  of	  unpredictability,	  and	  this	  terrifies	  the	  anxious	  individual,	  described	  as	  one	  who	  craves	  the	  security	  offered	  by	  answers,	  not	  found	  in	  the	  future,	  for	  repetition	  is	  found	  there.	  The	  world	  as	  my	  home	  offers	  no	  help	  during	  my	  endurance	  of	  anxiety,	  since	  the	  world	  knows	  not	  of	  things	  outside	  itself.	  In	  anxiety,	  I	  am	  alone	  in	  the	  most	  profound	  sense	  because	  that	  which	  I	  am	  anxious	  about	  does	  not	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  anyone	  other	  than	  myself.	  No	  one	  but	  me	  is	  equipped	  to	  deal	  with	  it.	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   In	  his	  book	  Repetition,	  Kierkegaard	  describes	  the	  phenomenon	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  freedom	  and	  understanding.	  According	  to	  Frederick	  Sontag,	  a	  noted	  Kierkegaard	  scholar,	  SK’s	  views	  of	  repetition	  are	  as	  follows:	  “Repetition	  gives	  to	  the	  ethical	  life	  this	  beauty	  through	  consistency	  because	  it	  develops	  the	  equilibrium	  in	  the	  self,	  without	  which	  the	  self	  would	  fall	  into	  despair.	  Thus,	  the	  anxiety	  of	  dread,	  which	  of	  all	  moods	  does	  the	  most	  to	  destroy	  happiness,	  is	  countered	  by	  consciously	  admitting	  repetition.	  The	  result	  is	  the	  maturity	  of	  life.”	  (KH,	  122)	  Repetition,	  as	  it	  allows	  for	  consistency,	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  complex	  conception	  of	  temporality.	  If	  we	  view	  the	  past	  as	  that	  which	  repeats	  itself,	  and	  the	  future	  as	  that	  which	  will	  be	  an	  embodiment	  of	  a	  repeated	  past,	  our	  notion	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  present	  comes	  into	  question.	  If	  we	  understand	  repetition	  as	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  movement,	  we	  see	  the	  present	  as	  void	  of	  repetition,	  thus	  we	  may	  deem	  the	  present	  as	  inauthentic.	  Indeed,	  Robert	  Mugerauer,	  author	  of	  Heidegger	  and	  Homecoming:	  The	  Leitmotif	  in	  the	  Later	  Writings,	  writes,	  “The	  inauthentic	  focuses	  on	  the	  present,	  both	  spatially	  and	  temporally,	  whereas	  Dasein	  exists	  in	  a	  different	  dimension…”	  (HH,	  47)	  (Dasein	  exists	  in	  this	  different	  dimension	  insofar	  as	  Dasein	  is	  authentic.)	  To	  say	  anxiety	  is	  “countered	  by	  consciously	  admitting	  repetition”	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  anxious	  individual	  may	  turn	  the	  experience	  of	  anxiety	  into	  something	  positive,	  insofar	  as	  the	  repetition	  of	  anxiety	  is	  accepted.	  To	  have	  anxiety	  about	  anxiety	  is	  to	  dismiss	  the	  potentiality	  of	  repetition.	  In	  order	  to	  consciously	  admit	  repetition,	  one	  must	  approach	  the	  world	  with	  openness	  and	  newness,	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  the	  insight	  which	  repetition	  itself	  provides.	  “To	  understand	  repetition	  is	  to	  overcome	  the	  unhappiness	  of	  recollection.”	  (KH,	  124)	  Repetition	  and	  recollection	  differ	  in	  that	  recollection	  is	  a	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matter	  of	  misconstrued	  reflection.	  To	  recollect	  an	  uncomfortable	  moment	  of	  panic	  is	  to	  think,	  I	  hope	  that	  never	  happens	  again.	  To	  experience	  repetition	  is	  to	  properly	  understand	  anxiety	  as	  that	  which	  must	  necessarily	  be	  repeated.	  Recollection	  evokes	  in	  the	  anxious	  individual	  a	  sense	  of	  sadness.	  By	  experiencing	  anxiety	  as	  it	  is	  repeated,	  insofar	  as	  one	  is	  properly	  educated	  by	  possibility,	  one	  perceives	  the	  phenomenon	  as	  nonthreatening	  and	  potentially	  beneficial	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  fundamental	  project	  of	  human	  existence.	  	  	  	  	  	  	   I	  have	  closed	  myself	  off	  from	  authentic	  possibility	  for	  the	  time	  being.	  I	  know	  this,	  because	  while	  anxiety	  repeats	  itself	  before	  me,	  frequently	  if	  not	  daily,	  I	  am	  never	  surprised	  by	  the	  form	  in	  which	  it	  comes,	  nor	  am	  I	  surprised	  by	  its	  arrival.	  As	  a	  so-­‐called	  later	  individual,	  my	  experiences	  with	  anxiety	  have	  become	  second	  nature.	  I	  have	  suppressed	  its	  repetition	  by	  means	  of	  medicine.	  I	  have	  adopted	  coping	  mechanisms	  that	  enable	  me	  to	  flee	  from	  uncanniness	  even	  before	  the	  sensation	  fully	  discloses	  itself.	  The	  practice	  of	  concentrated	  breathing	  furthers	  my	  being	  as	  closed.	  Breathing,	  an	  automatic	  action,	  characterizes	  my	  aliveness.	  As	  the	  beginning	  signs	  of	  anxiety	  assault	  me	  from	  everywhere	  and	  nowhere,	  I	  refer	  to	  an	  apparatus	  located	  inside	  my	  own	  body	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  achieve	  inner	  balance.	  By	  breathing,	  I	  simultaneously	  remind	  myself	  of	  my	  humanness	  and	  my	  aliveness→	  my	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	  In	  this	  way,	  I	  use	  my	  own	  body	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  relaxation.	  Relaxation,	  a	  state	  of	  calm,	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  synonymous	  to	  the	  “tranquillized	  familiarity”	  one	  finds	  amongst	  the	  ‘they’.	  (BT,	  183)	  Just	  as	  anxiety	  brings	  one	  back	  to	  confront	  one’s	  own	  existence,	  so	  too	  does	  the	  act	  of	  concentrated	  breathing.	  The	  difference	  between	  anxiety	  and	  breathing	  with	  respect	  to	  this	  bringing	  back,	  however,	  is	  what	  each	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brings	  Dasein	  back	  to.	  Anxiety	  brings	  one	  back	  to	  the	  ambiguous	  ground	  between	  two	  choices,	  complacency	  and	  individuality.	  Breathing,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  brings	  Dasein	  back	  to	  the	  ‘they’.	  Or,	  perhaps	  we	  should	  say	  it	  enables	  Dasein	  to	  reclaim	  its	  fallenness.	  	  In	  a	  similar	  manner	  to	  breathing,	  language	  also	  serves	  as	  a	  helpful	  tool	  in	  combating	  anxiety.	  I	  have	  survived	  this	  before,	  I	  will	  survive	  this	  again,	  I	  think	  to	  myself.	  This	  is	  just	  anxiety,	  it	  will	  end	  soon.	  Just	  as	  the	  girl	  supports	  herself	  with	  her	  own	  finitude	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  infinite	  abyss,	  I	  too	  find	  solace	  in	  my	  own	  finitude	  by	  reminding	  myself	  that	  the	  endurance	  of	  anxiety	  will	  come	  to	  an	  end.	  To	  focus	  on	  two	  constituents	  of	  my	  everydayness	  reaffirms	  not	  only	  my	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	  but	  also	  my	  mortality.	  (In	  this	  sense,	  being-­toward-­death	  reveals	  itself	  as	  a	  necessary	  entity	  of	  Dasein’s	  existence.)	  Breathing	  and	  language	  lend	  to	  my	  appropriation	  of	  reality	  as	  something	  established	  via	  consistency.	  	  	  	  	  “I	  will	  say	  that	  this	  is	  an	  adventure	  that	  every	  human	  being	  must	  go	  through-­‐	  to	  learn	  to	  be	  anxious	  in	  order	  that	  he	  may	  not	  perish	  either	  by	  never	  having	  been	  in	  anxiety	  or	  by	  succumbing	  in	  anxiety.	  Whoever	  has	  learned	  to	  be	  anxious	  in	  the	  right	  way	  has	  learned	  the	  ultimate.”	  -­‐	  Søren	  Kierkegaard	  	  	   Part	  Two:	  Anxiety	  as	  Attunement	  reveals	  anxiety	  as	  the	  means	  through	  which	  Dasein	  relates	  to	  the	  world.	  Learning	  to	  be	  anxious	  is	  arguably	  the	  most	  important	  element	  of	  attunement,	  along	  with	  the	  Heraclitean	  notion	  of	  listening;	  Dasein	  listens	  to	  the	  call	  of	  consciousness	  in	  order	  to	  be	  brought	  back	  onto	  one’s	  own	  self.	  Learning	  to	  be	  anxious	  and	  learning	  to	  be	  anxious	  in	  the	  right	  way	  appear	  to	  be	  one	  in	  the	  same,	  as	  learning	  to	  be	  anxious	  necessarily	  includes	  learning	  all	  that	  it	  means	  to	  be	  anxious-­‐	  including	  the	  carrying	  out	  of	  anxiety	  as	  a	  motivating	  force.	  To	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describe	  the	  process	  of	  learning	  to	  be	  anxious	  as	  an	  adventure	  is	  to	  ascribe	  anxiety	  itself	  as	  the	  end	  goal.	  Complexly,	  as	  is	  written	  elsewhere	  in	  this	  essay,	  anxiety	  is	  unique	  in	  that	  it	  is	  the	  end	  AND	  it	  is	  continuous.	  This	  is	  precisely	  one	  of	  the	  components	  of	  learning	  anxiety-­‐	  to	  recognize	  anxiety,	  and	  subsequently	  living	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  ways	  of	  anxiety.	  This	  is	  attunement.	  	  	   What	  exactly	  is	  one	  to	  learn	  about	  anxiety?	  Or,	  how	  does	  one	  learn	  anxiety?	  It	  would	  appear	  anxiety	  is	  not	  learned;	  it	  is	  a	  priori.	  One	  day	  in	  my	  childhood,	  it	  just	  happened	  to	  be	  that	  I	  was	  nervous.	  I	  didn’t	  need	  to	  learn	  that	  I	  was	  anxious	  because	  I	  knew	  that	  I	  was	  anxious…	  Or	  was	  that	  so?	  As	  I	  reflect	  on	  earlier	  years	  of	  anxiety,	  I	  wasn’t	  certain	  what	  I	  was	  feeling	  in	  moments	  of	  panic.	  My	  knowledge	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  was	  limited;	  I	  was	  unable	  to	  say	  much	  else	  beyond	  that	  I	  “felt	  weird”	  or	  nervous,	  or	  short	  of	  breath.	  It	  wasn’t	  until	  my	  dad	  told	  me	  I	  was	  experiencing	  anxiety	  that	  I	  was	  able	  to	  identify	  it	  as	  something	  more	  concrete	  than	  merely	  a	  bizarre	  sensation.	  Here	  in	  lies	  the	  first	  step	  of	  learning,	  a	  pathway	  during	  the	  adventure:	  recognition.	  It	  is	  recognition	  that	  enables	  any	  and	  all	  movement	  forward.	  Before	  recognition,	  the	  positivity	  associated	  with	  anxiety	  is	  masked	  by	  one’s	  inability	  to	  describe	  the	  phenomenon.	  Recognition	  of	  anxiety	  coincides	  with	  ‘the	  moment’:	  the	  sudden	  occurrence	  of	  choice,	  situated	  between	  complacency	  and	  progression.	  “Anxiety	  is	  that	  which	  places	  one	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  decision	  about	  how	  one	  should	  live,	  about	  how	  time	  itself	  is	  experienced.”	  (IKC,	  181)	  	  	   Anxiety	  itself	  is	  necessary	  in	  order	  for	  Dasein	  to	  learn	  anxiety.	  Complete	  participation	  in	  time	  and	  space	  allows	  for	  the	  experience	  of	  anxiety	  to	  present	  itself.	  Otherwise,	  one	  views	  the	  world	  from	  the	  periphery,	  and	  anxiety	  becomes	  something	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unobtainable.	  To	  learn	  anxiety	  is	  to	  be	  anxious,	  again	  and	  again.	  In	  the	  instance	  that	  Dasein	  neglects	  to	  reflect	  on	  happenings	  of	  anxiety,	  the	  meaning	  is	  covered	  by	  silence.	  To	  participate	  in	  the	  adventure	  that	  is	  learning	  to	  be	  anxious,	  is	  to	  be	  continuously	  confronted	  with	  moments	  of	  anxiety.	  Only	  once	  Dasein	  has	  acquired	  the	  proper	  knowledge	  made	  available	  during	  one’s	  adventure	  (or	  endurance)	  through	  anxiety,	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  achieve	  a	  life	  constituted	  by	  authenticity.	  	   	  	   At	  this	  time,	  we	  ask	  why	  it	  is	  important	  to	  learn	  to	  be	  anxious.	  Why	  does	  Kierkegaard	  view	  the	  adventure	  of	  anxiety	  as	  a	  necessity	  for	  all	  human	  beings?	  He	  answers	  this	  question	  as	  he	  presents	  two	  cases:	  she	  who	  has	  never	  been	  in	  anxiety,	  and	  she	  who	  succumbs	  in	  anxiety.	  According	  to	  Kierkegaard,	  neither	  case	  is	  favorable.	  Moreover,	  each	  possesses	  the	  danger	  of	  perish.	  She	  who	  has	  never	  been	  in	  anxiety	  has	  failed	  to	  hear	  the	  call	  of	  her	  consciousness.	  She	  exists	  solely	  as	  an	  element	  of	  which	  comprises	  the	  ‘they’.	  Her	  knowledge	  of	  herself,	  the	  world,	  and	  herself	  as	  a	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world,	  is	  limited	  by	  her	  lack	  of	  experiences.	  She	  possesses	  a	  distorted	  representation	  of	  her	  freedom	  and	  of	  her	  possibility.	  In	  the	  most	  profound	  sense,	  her	  existence	  is	  marked	  by	  incompleteness,	  or	  perhaps	  more	  appropriate,	  an	  incomplete	  expression	  of	  self-­‐realization.	  She	  has	  never	  been	  assaulted	  by	  the	  moment,	  despite	  the	  moment’s	  attempts.	  She	  therefore	  fails	  to	  move	  alongside	  the	  current	  of	  anxiety.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  she	  who	  succumbs	  in	  anxiety	  is	  inhibited	  in	  a	  certain	  way.	  She	  simultaneously	  fails	  to	  seize	  her	  own	  most	  possibility	  as	  she	  fails	  to	  harness	  the	  power	  anxiety	  could	  potentially	  be	  and	  provide.	  Anxiety	  becomes	  instead	  becomes	  something	  Dasein	  is	  anxious	  about.	  In	  the	  instance	  Dasein	  learns	  to	  be	  anxious	  in	  the	  right	  way,	  anxiety	  is	  what	  she	  is	  anxious-­‐for.	  (Heidegger’s	  
	  	  
	  	  34	  
adjustment	  of	  prepositions	  describes	  the	  way	  in	  which	  anxiety	  affects	  Dasein.	  To	  say	  “anxious	  for”	  is	  to	  make	  anxiety	  analogous	  to	  desire.	  Dasein	  is	  anxious	  for,	  or	  longs	  to	  be,	  a	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.)	  	  	   For	  SK,	  having	  learned	  “the	  ultimate”	  is	  to	  have	  learned	  to	  be	  anxious	  in	  the	  right	  way.	  This	  notion	  of	  the	  ultimate	  is	  logical	  as	  we	  regard	  anxiety	  as	  the	  tool	  with	  which	  we	  navigate	  through	  space	  and	  time.	  If	  anxiety	  is	  the	  tool	  Dasein	  uses	  in	  order	  to	  propel	  one’s	  self	  forward,	  and	  each	  movement	  brings	  one	  closer	  toward	  the	  goal	  of	  authentic	  existence,	  then	  using	  anxiety	  to	  one’s	  advantage	  is	  in	  fact	  the	  most	  important	  knowledge	  Dasein	  can	  and	  should	  acquire.	  Furthermore,	  by	  learning	  anxiety,	  one	  avoids	  the	  misfortunes	  allotted	  to	  she	  who	  is	  not	  anxious,	  and	  she	  who	  succumbs.	  In	  a	  certain	  sense,	  the	  two	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  opposing	  lifestyles.	  He	  who	  is	  educated	  properly	  executes	  the	  proper	  lifestyle,	  according	  to	  SK.	  “If	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  his	  education	  he	  misunderstands	  the	  anxiety…	  then	  he	  is	  lost.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  whoever	  is	  educated	  (by	  possibility)	  remains	  with	  anxiety…”	  (CA,	  159)	  Here,	  we	  learn	  the	  importance	  of	  learning	  in	  the	  right	  way	  to	  be	  anxious,	  which	  is	  distinguished	  from	  learning	  to	  be	  anxious	  in	  the	  right	  way.	  When	  SK	  writes	  of	  learning	  to	  be	  anxious	  in	  the	  right	  way,	  he	  is	  describing	  what	  it	  means	  for	  Dasein	  to	  reap	  benefits	  of	  anxiety.	  Learning	  in	  the	  right	  way	  means	  first	  and	  foremost	  to	  adequately	  understand	  anxiety.	  He	  who	  understands	  possibility	  goes	  on	  to	  learn	  in	  the	  right	  way	  about	  the	  right	  things.	  Unlike	  he	  who	  lacks	  the	  proper	  education,	  he	  who	  remains	  with	  anxiety	  is	  not	  lost.	  Rather,	  he	  knows	  the	  ground	  upon	  which	  he	  moves	  for	  he	  is	  the	  ground	  upon	  which	  he	  moves.	  Here,	  anxiety	  is	  reinstated	  as	  a	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guiding	  and	  motivating	  force.	  These	  two	  notions,	  ground	  (Heidegger)	  and	  lostness	  (Kierkegaard),	  appropriately	  lead	  us	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  anxiety	  as	  dizzying.	  	  	  “Anxiety	  may	  be	  compared	  with	  dizziness.	  He	  whose	  eye	  happens	  to	  look	  down	  into	  the	  yawning	  abyss	  becomes	  dizzy.	  But	  what	  is	  the	  reason	  for	  this?	  It	  is	  just	  as	  much	  in	  his	  own	  eye	  as	  in	  the	  abyss,	  for	  suppose	  he	  had	  not	  looked	  down.	  Hence	  anxiety	  is	  the	  dizziness	  of	  freedom,	  which	  emerges	  when	  the	  spirit	  wants	  to	  posit	  the	  synthesis	  and	  freedom	  looks	  down	  into	  its	  own	  possibility,	  laying	  hold	  of	  finiteness	  to	  support	  itself.	  Freedom	  succumbs	  in	  this	  dizziness.”	  (CA,	  61)	  	  	   Firstly,	  we	  must	  identify	  the	  markings	  of	  dizziness	  as	  a	  sensation,	  i.e.	  the	  experience	  of	  being	  dizzy.	  Being	  dizzy	  is	  due	  to	  one’s	  state	  of	  unbalance.	  In	  moments	  of	  dizziness,	  I	  feel	  the	  sway	  of	  my	  body	  as	  it	  struggles	  to	  find	  its	  center.	  Objects	  in	  my	  visual	  field	  are	  spinning	  and	  distorted.	  Things	  lose	  the	  meaning	  they	  possess	  in	  my	  balanced	  state.	  Nothing	  makes	  sense.	  In	  this	  present	  moment	  as	  I	  work	  to	  articulate	  dizziness,	  I	  find	  it	  similar	  to	  anxiety	  in	  the	  way	  that	  I	  am	  grappling	  to	  find	  the	  proper	  vocabulary	  which	  would	  adequately	  describe	  the	  experience.	  (In	  the	  realm	  outside	  of	  philosophy,	  namely	  physiology,	  moments	  of	  anxiety	  are	  indeed	  dizzying.	  I	  literally	  feel	  unbalanced,	  even	  nauseous,	  in	  instances	  of	  panic.	  Upon	  reading	  Kierkegaard’s	  comparison	  of	  anxiety	  to	  dizziness,	  I	  yet	  again	  celebrate	  philosophy	  as	  the	  means	  through	  which	  I	  am	  able	  to	  connect	  strange	  physical	  feelings	  to	  broader	  meanings.)	  I	  take	  the	  “it”	  Kierkegaard	  describes	  as	  being	  located	  in	  both	  one’s	  eye	  and	  the	  abyss,	  to	  be	  that	  which	  enables	  dizziness.	  As	  one	  peers	  into	  an	  abyss,	  one	  is	  made	  aware	  of	  several	  things,	  the	  first	  being	  the	  incompleteness	  of	  the	  abyss.	  The	  visual	  of	  something	  infinite	  produces	  in	  the	  finite	  being	  a	  state	  of	  unbalance.	  Consequently,	  one	  is	  made	  aware	  of	  her	  immediate	  relation	  to	  that	  which	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is	  infinite.	  Kierkegaard	  argues	  had	  she	  not	  looked	  down,	  she	  would	  not	  feel	  dizzy.	  Had	  she	  not	  become	  aware	  of	  the	  possibility,	  manifest	  in	  the	  dark,	  unconceivable	  hole,	  she	  would	  have	  remained	  balanced.	  Perhaps	  oblivious	  is	  a	  more	  useful	  term	  for	  her	  state	  prior	  to	  her	  loss	  of	  balance,	  as	  she	  was	  oblivious	  to	  the	  hole,	  representative	  of	  freedom.	  In	  one’s	  attempt	  to	  stop	  the	  dizziness,	  one	  grabs	  hold	  of	  something	  stable,	  something	  that	  reassures	  us	  of	  our	  own	  inner	  stability.	  The	  dizziness	  
produced	  by	  the	  awareness	  of	  the	  abyss’s	  infiniteness	  is	  analogous	  to	  anxiety	  produced	  
by	  the	  awareness	  of	  possibility,	  specifically	  the	  possibility	  of	  freedom.	  Importantly,	  both	  dizziness	  and	  anxiety	  coincide	  with	  uncertainty.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  abyss,	  the	  bottom	  is	  uncertain.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  time,	  the	  future	  is	  uncertain.	  It	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  uncertainty	  that	  provokes	  in	  the	  anxious	  individual	  the	  dizzying	  realization	  of	  her	  own	  potentiality.	  Even	  more	  notable	  amongst	  the	  similarities	  between	  dizziness	  and	  anxiety,	  is	  the	  subject’s	  desire	  for	  the	  experience	  to	  stop.	  In	  dizziness,	  that	  feeling	  of	  unbalance	  and	  disarray	  is	  comparable	  to	  the	  uncanniness	  one	  experiences	  in	  anxiety.	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  seek	  refuge	  from	  the	  phenomenon,	  one	  seeks	  that	  which	  is	  stable,	  certain,	  and	  seemingly	  permanent.	  Just	  as	  she	  who	  peers	  into	  the	  abyss	  steadies	  herself	  with	  her	  own	  finitude,	  the	  anxious	  subject	  escapes	  uncanniness	  by	  
fleeing.	  	  	   The	  concept	  of	  fleeing	  gives	  way	  to	  two	  distinct	  ideas:	  fleeing	  toward	  and	  fleeing	  from.	  (Here	  again	  we	  see	  the	  importance	  of	  language,	  specifically	  the	  use	  of	  prepositions,	  as	  a	  subtle	  change	  profoundly	  changes	  a	  word’s	  meaning.)	  In	  flight,	  the	  individual	  demonstrates	  her	  capacity	  to	  abandon	  the	  discomfort	  of	  her	  immediacy.	  Heidegger	  writes,	  “Entangled	  flight	  into	  the	  being-­‐at-­‐home	  of	  publicness	  is	  flight	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from	  not-­‐being-­‐at-­‐home,	  that	  is,	  from	  the	  uncanniness	  which	  lies	  in	  Dasein	  as	  thrown,	  as	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world	  entrusted	  to	  itself	  in	  its	  being.”	  (BT,	  183)	  In	  anxiety,	  and	  given	  that	  one	  is	  educated	  properly,	  flight	  from	  the	  world	  is	  a	  flight	  toward	  authenticity.	  The	  mission	  of	  anxiety	  is	  to	  facilitate	  the	  movement	  that	  is	  flight,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  flight	  from	  publicness	  and	  home.	  In	  spite	  of	  anxiety’s	  will,	  Dasein	  also	  possesses	  the	  capacity	  to	  utilize	  flight	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  she	  may	  flee	  uncanniness.	  Thus	  fleeing	  is	  demonstrative	  of	  Dasein’s	  ability	  to	  transcend	  into	  the	  realm	  most	  favorable	  at	  any	  given	  time.	  Most	  often,	  we	  fly	  toward	  what	  feels	  good,	  not	  what	  is	  ethically	  appropriate.	  	  	   At	  this	  time,	  I	  wish	  to	  enter	  a	  brief	  discussion	  on	  the	  significance	  of	  home;	  the	  location	  of	  one’s	  existence	  is	  the	  world.	  Here,	  one	  exhibits	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	  In	  the	  world,	  I	  am	  home,	  for	  home	  is	  representative	  of	  all	  things	  Dasein	  regards	  most	  familiar.	  The	  things	  that	  make	  up	  my	  home	  are	  things	  whose	  significance	  I	  know,	  value,	  and	  foster.	  Additionally,	  home	  possesses	  the	  notion	  of	  habituation;	  it	  is	  a	  place	  revisited	  where	  similar,	  if	  not	  the	  same,	  actions	  occur.	  The	  area	  is	  enclosed,	  the	  boundaries	  literal	  or	  imaginary.	  The	  goal	  of	  the	  boundaries	  is	  to	  separate	  what	  is	  home	  from	  what	  is	  not	  home-­‐	  what	  is	  personally	  constructed	  and	  thus	  familiar,	  from	  that	  which	  is	  unfamiliar,	  unknown,	  and	  abstract.	  In	  my	  home,	  my	  perceptions	  of	  my	  sensory	  contents	  are	  consistent	  and	  affirmed	  with	  each	  revisit.	  The	  meaning	  I	  associate	  with	  things	  has	  become	  second	  nature;	  it	  requires	  no	  contemplation.	  Instead,	  I	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  predictability	  and	  security.	  I	  feel	  at	  ease.	  I	  feel	  at	  home	  in	  my	  home.	  By	  inhabiting	  the	  world,	  I	  am	  demonstrating	  my	  desire	  to	  familiarize	  my	  surroundings.	  I	  want	  to	  feel	  comfortable,	  and	  to	  establish	  the	  relations	  that	  will	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ground	  me.	  I	  want	  to	  feel	  at	  home.	  In	  his	  chapter	  “At	  Home	  in	  Metaphysics’	  Uncanny	  Homelessness”,	  Mugerauer	  writes,	  “…Genuine	  homecoming	  would	  amount	  to	  a	  refusal	  of	  the	  comfortable	  being-­‐at-­‐home	  and	  instead	  enter	  into	  not-­‐being-­‐at-­‐home	  in	  the	  uncanny…”	  (HH,	  43)	  With	  Mugerauer’s	  help,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  make	  the	  distinction	  between	  being-­‐at-­‐home	  and	  feeling-­‐at-­‐home.	  Or,	  perhaps	  the	  distinction	  should	  instead	  be	  made	  between	  home	  and	  world.	  As	  we	  have	  asserted,	  the	  human	  being	  always	  already	  exists	  in	  the	  world	  as	  a	  being-­‐in-­‐the-­‐world.	  To	  feel	  at	  home	  is	  to	  live	  amidst	  familiarity,	  and	  publicness-­‐	  to	  borrow	  from	  Heidegger.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  an	  existence	  marked	  by	  authentic	  possibility,	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  individual	  in	  question	  to	  change	  their	  conception	  of	  home;	  to	  find	  a	  new	  home,	  namely	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  authenticity,	  which	  is	  represented	  by	  feelings	  of	  uncanniness.	  To	  deem	  home	  as	  that	  which	  is	  unfamiliar	  is	  to	  abandon	  the	  public	  realm	  of	  the	  ‘they’,	  as	  well	  as	  what	  is	  commonly	  conceived	  of	  as	  home.	  Thus	  by	  viewing	  home	  as	  that	  which	  is	  achieved	  by	  feeling	  not-­‐at-­‐home,	  one	  accepts	  anxiety	  and	  thereby	  lives	  in	  an	  auspiciously	  precarious	  state	  of	  being.	  But	  in	  his	  text,	  Mugerauer	  concerns	  himself	  with	  the	  issues	  of	  homecoming,	  in	  addition	  to	  home.	  Homecoming,	  to	  come	  home,	  is	  to	  return	  to	  a	  state	  of	  being-­‐at-­‐home.	  Genuine	  homecoming,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  Mugerauer	  and	  Heidegger,	  means	  for	  the	  individual	  to	  come	  home;	  but	  home	  takes	  on	  a	  radically	  different	  meaning.	  Dasein,	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  authentic,	  lives	  in	  a	  dimension	  contrary	  to	  that	  which	  everyone	  else	  considers	  home.	  So,	  Dasein	  is	  home	  in	  authenticity.	  To	  feel	  a	  sense	  of	  homelessness	  is	  to	  be	  at	  home,	  insofar	  as	  home	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  ground	  of	  possibility.	  With	  respect	  to	  authentic	  existence,	  the	  concept	  of	  home	  should	  be	  conceptualized	  as	  a	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combination	  of	  concreteness	  and	  ambiguity.	  	  “The	  crucial	  point	  for	  us	  is	  that	  in	  everydayness	  the	  mode	  of	  being	  ‘at	  home’	  does	  not	  realize	  Dasein’s	  full	  potential:	  indeed,	  it	  prevents	  it	  from	  coming	  to	  itself.”	  (HH,	  34)	  	  	  	   	  	   	  We	  revisit	  the	  notion	  of	  flight	  by	  reviewing	  Jean-­‐Paul	  Sartre’s	  conception.	  He	  writes,	  “I	  flee	  in	  order	  not	  to	  know,	  but	  I	  can	  not	  avoid	  knowing	  that	  I	  am	  fleeing;	  and	  the	  flight	  from	  anguish	  is	  only	  a	  mode	  of	  becoming	  conscious	  of	  anguish.”	  (BN,	  43)	  What	  does	  Dasein	  wish	  not	  to	  know?	  Anxiety	  itself.	  For	  Sartre,	  flight	  from	  anguish	  is	  what	  he	  calls	  bad	  faith.	  But	  in	  order	  to	  properly	  delve	  into	  bad	  faith	  as	  it	  applies	  to	  our	  discussion,	  we	  must	  first	  revisit	  the	  fundamental	  aspects	  of	  Sartre’s	  philosophy,	  briefly	  described	  earlier.	  The	  framework	  of	  temporality	  shapes	  the	  concept	  of	  anguish.	  Using	  the	  past,	  present,	  and	  future	  as	  guidelines	  for	  consciousness	  gives	  way	  to	  a	  concrete	  discussion	  of	  freedom.	  According	  to	  Sartre,	  we	  as	  humans	  exhibit	  absolute	  freedom.	  In	  fact,	  as	  he	  famously	  stated,	  “we	  are	  condemned	  to	  be	  free.”	  Although	  sinister	  in	  tone,	  his	  use	  of	  the	  word	  condemn	  perhaps	  best	  describes	  the	  inevitable	  predicament	  of	  existence,	  manifest	  in	  anguish.	  In	  addition	  to	  being	  free,	  we	  are	  also	  responsible	  beings.	  We	  live	  freely	  and	  we	  must	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  our	  responsibility	  as	  that	  which	  assigns	  meaning	  to	  the	  world	  in	  which	  we	  live.	  Thirdly,	  we	  are	  conscious	  beings.	  Complexly,	  as	  conscious	  beings,	  we	  are	  conscious	  of	  being	  conscious.	  This	  is	  what	  Sartre	  calls	  self-­‐reflective	  consciousness,	  “where	  consciousness	  becomes	  its	  own	  object.”	  (RPG,	  JPS,	  21)	  Self-­‐reflective	  consciousness	  is	  analogous	  to	  Heidegger’s	  discussion	  of	  self-­‐consciousness.	  As	  the	  individual	  is	  made	  aware	  of	  his	  own	  consciousness,	  he	  realizes	  his	  self	  as	  something	  conscious;	  a	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being	  that	  exists.	  Self-­‐consciousness	  is	  most	  generally	  conceived	  of	  as	  having	  to	  do	  with	  vulnerability,	  evoked	  by	  the	  Other.	  In	  this	  context,	  self-­‐conscious	  describes	  the	  realization	  of	  one’s	  own	  self	  as	  free.	  Furthermore,	  it	  enables	  the	  awareness	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  anxiety.	  For	  in	  anxiety,	  one	  is	  utterly	  alone.	  An	  important	  part	  of	  self-­‐consciousness	  is	  the	  understanding	  of	  this	  aloneness;	  to	  be	  conscious	  of	  one’s	  self,	  as	  that	  which	  possesses	  the	  power	  to	  advance	  the	  fundamental	  project	  at	  hand,	  namely	  the	  continued	  execution	  of	  responsible	  freedom.	  	   Because	  we	  are	  conscious	  of	  our	  consciousness,	  a	  complex	  element	  must	  be	  considered	  in	  one’s	  flight	  from	  anguish,	  namely	  bad	  faith.	  “Bad	  faith:	  A	  lie	  to	  oneself	  
within	  the	  unity	  of	  a	  single	  consciousness.”	  (Barnes/	  BN,	  547)	  We	  see	  here	  under	  Sartre’s	  view	  that	  flight	  from	  anxiety	  does	  not	  eliminate	  anxiety;	  rather	  flight	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  temporary	  means	  of	  assuaging	  the	  discomfort	  associated	  with	  anxiety.	  Flight	  is	  one’s	  attempt	  to	  forget	  anxiety	  exists.	  According	  to	  Heidegger	  however,	  there	  is	  a	  latent	  anxiety	  in	  all	  of	  us,	  and	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  we	  are	  at	  one	  time	  or	  another	  presented	  with	  the	  choice	  of	  accepting	  or	  ignoring	  it.	  To	  be	  in	  anxiety	  is	  to	  have	  accepted	  what	  one	  inherently	  possesses.	  Sartre	  means	  to	  speak	  along	  similar	  lines.	  In	  flight	  from	  anxiety,	  one	  attempts	  to	  fool	  one’s	  own	  self	  into	  thinking	  she	  have	  indeed	  taken	  flight-­‐	  but	  absolute	  flight	  is	  impossible,	  for	  one	  is	  conscious	  of	  one’s	  own	  intent.	  Bad	  faith	  describes	  one’s	  inability	  to	  flee	  anxiety	  completely,	  due	  to	  self-­‐reflective	  consciousness.	  	  “This	  means	  that	  anguish,	  the	  intentional	  aim	  of	  anguish,	  and	  a	  flight	  from	  anguish	  toward	  reassuring	  myths	  must	  all	  be	  given	  in	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  same	  consciousness.	  In	  a	  word,	  I	  flee	  in	  order	  not	  to	  know,	  but	  I	  can	  not	  avoid	  knowing	  that	  I	  am	  fleeing;	  and	  the	  flight	  from	  anguish	  is	  only	  a	  mode	  of	  becoming	  conscious	  of	  anguish.	  Thus	  anguish,	  properly	  speaking,	  can	  be	  neither	  hidden	  nor	  avoided.”	  (BN,	  43)	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  We	  see	  here	  the	  differing	  perspectives	  of	  Heidegger	  and	  Sartre.	  While	  Heidegger	  claims	  that	  inauthentic	  existence	  is	  one’s	  avoidance	  of	  anxiety,	  Sartre	  argues	  by	  way	  of	  bad	  faith	  that	  anxiety	  cannot	  be	  avoided.	  In	  fact,	  the	  conceptions	  of	  flight	  as	  being	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Part	  Three	  	   In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  detail	  the	  views	  of	  Medard	  Boss	  and	  Leslie	  H.	  Farber,	  two	  thinkers	  who	  beautifully	  articulate	  and	  juxtapose	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  anxiety	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  existentialist	  thinking.	  Additionally,	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  connections	  between	  the	  aforementioned	  philosophical	  opinions	  of	  Heidegger,	  Sartre,	  and	  Kierkegaard,	  and	  readings	  I	  acquired	  from	  sessions	  in	  cognitive	  behavioral	  therapy.	  Boss	  and	  Farber	  will	  aid	  in	  my	  analysis	  by	  serving	  as	  the	  bridge	  between	  the	  physical	  experience	  of	  anxiety	  and	  the	  discussion	  of	  anxiety.	  For	  anxiety	  affects	  the	  anxious	  individual	  in	  more	  ways	  than	  assaulting	  her	  with	  the	  ‘moment’,	  namely	  physiological	  responses	  like	  shortness	  of	  breath	  and	  tightness	  of	  the	  chest-­‐	  characteristics	  of	  the	  fight	  or	  flight	  response	  of	  the	  human	  body	  in	  the	  face	  of	  danger.	  I	  will	  also	  address	  what	  I	  believe	  to	  be	  the	  opposite	  of	  anxiety.	  Flight	  towards	  the	  ‘they’	  enables	  Dasein	  to	  flee	  the	  immediacy	  of	  her	  situation,	  but	  in	  what	  
specific	  state	  of	  being	  is	  Dasein	  in	  periods	  of	  ease?	  	   In	  Anxiety,	  Guilt	  and	  Psychotherapeutic	  Liberation,	  Medard	  Boss	  begins	  his	  essay	  by	  describing	  the	  Of	  What	  and	  the	  About	  What	  of	  anxiety.	  He	  writes,	  “The	  Of	  
What	  involved	  in	  every	  anxiety	  is	  always	  a	  crippling	  attack	  on	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  human	  existence…The	  About	  What	  of	  human	  anxiety	  is	  thus	  existence	  itself	  in	  so	  far	  as	  every	  anxiety	  is	  always	  concerned	  and	  fearful	  about	  the	  existence’s	  continuing	  integrity.”	  (REPP,	  77)	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  for	  one’s	  existence	  to	  have	  integrity?	  Integrity	  refers	  to	  the	  intactness	  of	  something.	  Integrity	  of	  the	  human	  existence	  therefore	  describes	  existence	  as	  that	  which	  persists.	  Although	  subtle,	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  modes	  of	  anxiety	  is	  of	  great	  significance.	  The	  Of	  What	  refers	  to	  the	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fundamental	  aspect	  of	  anxiety;	  it	  is	  concentrated	  anxiety	  manifest	  in	  ‘the	  moment’.	  	  The	  anxious	  individual	  is	  anxious	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  assault	  on	  existence.	  And	  because,	  in	  its	  assault,	  anxiety	  disguises	  itself	  as	  an	  attack	  on	  the	  integrity	  of	  one’s	  existence,	  one	  is	  thus	  anxious	  about	  anxiety.	  The	  About	  What,	  “which	  it	  feels	  alarmed	  about”,	  is	  existence	  itself,	  for	  existence	  is	  that	  which	  the	  subject	  wishes	  to	  preserve	  and	  that	  which	  becomes	  subject	  to	  destruction.	  The	  About	  What	  serves	  as	  a	  more	  general	  explanation	  for	  the	  presence	  of	  anxiety.	  As	  one	  acknowledges	  her	  existence,	  she	  is	  simultaneously	  confronted	  with	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  end	  of	  her	  existence,	  and	  this	  evokes	  anxiety.	  Anxiety	  as	  a	  continuous	  manifestation	  of	  this	  realization	  is	  therefore	  one’s	  awareness	  and	  desire	  to	  avoid	  death,	  which	  Boss	  poetically	  describes	  as	  an	  attack	  on	  life’s	  integrity.	  This	  is	  self-­‐consciousness.	  It	  would	  then	  appear	  that	  an	  oblivious	  existence	  is	  one’s	  way	  out	  of	  the	  Of	  What	  and	  the	  About	  What.	  To	  disregard	  the	  reality	  of	  existence	  is	  to	  live	  non-­‐anxious.	  Is	  this	  in	  fact	  the	  way	  to	  overcome	  anxiety?	  	  “The	  highest	  aim	  of	  all	  psychotherapy	  is	  and	  remains	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  our	  patients	  to	  an	  ability-­‐to-­‐love-­‐and-­‐trust	  which	  permits	  all	  oppression	  by	  anxiety	  and	  guilt	  to	  be	  surmounted	  as	  mere	  misunderstandings.	  Such	  trust	  can	  and	  may	  be	  fitly	  called	  the	  most	  mature	  form	  of	  human	  openness.”	  (REPP,	  89)	  We	  see	  then	  that	  openness,	  from	  which	  love	  and	  trust	  stem,	  becomes	  the	  key	  to	  accepting	  anxiety.	  Through	  love,	  trust,	  and	  ultimately	  openness,	  the	  anxious	  individual	  is	  capable	  of	  viewing	  anxiety’s	  in-­‐itself;	  what	  it	  really	  is.	  And	  what	  is	  anxiety?	  –a	  misunderstanding,	  according	  to	  Boss.	  	  	   Let	  us	  now	  reflect	  on	  the	  following	  excerpt	  from	  Being	  and	  Time:	  “What	  crowds	  in	  upon	  us	  is	  not	  this	  or	  that,	  nor	  is	  it	  everything	  objectively	  present	  
	  	  
	  	  44	  
together	  a	  sum,	  but	  the	  possibility	  of	  things	  at	  hand	  in	  general,	  that	  is,	  the	  world	  itself.	  When	  anxiety	  has	  subsided,	  in	  our	  everyday	  way	  of	  talking	  we	  are	  accustomed	  to	  say,	  “it	  was	  really	  nothing.”(BT,	  181)	  It	  was	  really	  nothing	  describes	  precisely	  what	  anxiety	  is:	  a	  nothingness,	  concretized	  by	  immediacy,	  within	  the	  senseless	  and	  meaningless	  world	  in	  which	  the	  anxious	  individual	  lives.	  In	  a	  world	  in	  which	  all	  meaning	  is	  rendered	  useless,	  the	  anxious	  individual	  grows	  dizzy	  with	  confusion	  and	  fear.	  As	  the	  world	  regains	  meaning	  and	  the	  anxiety	  has	  gone	  away,	  one	  looks	  back	  with	  coherency	  and	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  moment	  lacked	  reasonable,	  substantial	  evidence	  of	  impending	  danger.	  It	  was	  just	  a	  misunderstanding,	  now	  I	  see	  that	  it	  was	  
really	  nothing.	  This	  notion	  in	  its	  entirety	  is	  strengthened	  by	  an	  essay	  I	  was	  assigned	  to	  read	  by	  a	  cognitive	  behavioral	  therapist.	  Here,	  we	  see	  language	  as	  the	  tool	  through	  which	  understanding	  is	  conveyed,	  and	  understanding	  is	  the	  tool	  through	  which	  I	  learn	  to	  be	  anxious.	  The	  excerpt	  reads,	  “We	  call	  these	  thoughts	  and	  images	  automatic	  because	  they	  are	  rapid	  and	  spontaneous	  and	  occur	  without	  logical	  thinking	  or	  analysis.	  The	  automatic	  thoughts	  and	  images	  seem	  plausible	  when	  they	  occur,	  but	  are	  often	  less	  believable	  in	  retrospect.	  Looking	  back,	  it	  may	  be	  clear	  that	  they	  are	  distorted-­‐	  unrealistic,	  exaggerated,	  or	  wholly	  erroneous.”	  Alas,	  the	  psychiatrist	  and	  the	  philosopher	  see	  eye	  to	  eye.	  Boss,	  Heidegger,	  and	  X	  articulate	  anxiety’s	  ability	  to	  confuse	  the	  subject,	  as	  ‘the	  moment’	  puts	  fourth	  a	  misleading	  intensity.	  	  	  	   Like	  Boss,	  Leslie	  H.	  Farber	  defines	  anxiety	  as	  a	  “painful	  state	  invoked	  by	  threat	  to	  human	  integrity.”	  (REPP,	  284)	  Her	  essay	  “Will	  and	  Anxiety”	  works	  to	  distinguish	  between	  anxiety	  as	  it	  is	  a	  basic	  human	  power,	  and	  will	  as	  the	  power	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which	  drives	  all	  human	  actions.	  It	  is	  under	  her	  belief	  that	  the	  definition	  of	  anxiety	  remains	  problematic	  in	  its	  ambiguity.	  This	  ambiguity	  is	  due	  to	  one’s	  tendency	  to	  describe	  other	  states	  of	  being,	  among	  which	  include	  uncertainty,	  alienation,	  and	  queasiness,	  as	  anxiety.	  While	  these	  three	  are	  surely	  symptoms	  of	  anxiety,	  they	  do	  not	  necessarily	  place	  the	  subject	  in	  anxiety.	  Her	  critique	  of	  the	  phenomenological	  perspective	  of	  anxiety	  aids	  in	  her	  analysis	  of	  the	  will.	  	  	   She	  writes,	  “Unlike	  the	  will,	  which	  pushes	  actively	  toward	  its	  goal,	  whether	  appropriate	  or	  inappropriate,	  anxiety	  is	  an	  ache	  which	  helplessly	  cries	  for	  relief.”	  (REPP,	  284)	  Immediately,	  we	  may	  view	  the	  difference	  between	  will	  and	  anxiety	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  physiological	  discomfort.	  As	  the	  will	  aids	  in	  the	  forward	  movement	  of	  the	  human	  being’s	  fundamental	  project,	  anxiety	  is	  that	  which	  brings	  the	  project	  to	  an	  abrupt	  halt,	  forcing	  the	  individual	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  their	  anxious	  feelings	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another.	  Farber	  makes	  the	  claim	  that	  philosophical	  theories	  have	  placed	  too	  much	  importance	  on	  anxiety,	  naming	  it	  as	  a	  force	  of	  equal	  capacity	  to	  the	  will.	  She	  asserts	  that	  anxiety	  should	  instead	  be	  viewed	  as	  the	  “…range	  of	  distress	  which	  attends	  willing	  what	  cannot	  be	  willed…	  anxiety	  can	  be	  located	  in	  the	  ever-­‐widening	  split	  between	  the	  will	  and	  the	  impossible	  object	  of	  the	  will.”	  (REPP,	  288)	  Perhaps	  then	  anxiety	  stands	  as	  an	  antithesis	  to	  will,	  as	  it	  attempts	  to	  bring	  about	  that	  which	  cannot	  be	  brought	  about.	  We	  should	  understand	  the	  “impossible	  object	  of	  the	  will”	  as	  
that	  which	  anxiety	  simultaneously	  inhibits	  and	  considers.	  From	  this	  definition,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  better	  understand	  anxiety	  as	  possessing	  qualities	  of	  deception.	  Let	  us	  consider	  a	  mundane	  example	  in	  order	  to	  elucidate	  these	  claims.	  I	  grow	  anxious	  as	  I	  consider	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  plane	  on	  which	  I	  am	  a	  passenger	  crashing.	  The	  more	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anxious	  I	  become,	  the	  more	  horrid	  places	  I	  am	  taken	  by	  my	  imagination.	  Regardless	  of	  my	  anxiety	  and	  the	  thoughts	  it	  brings	  about,	  my	  worrying	  has	  no	  influence	  or	  power	  over	  the	  outcome	  of	  my	  plane	  ride.	  This	  is	  what	  Farber	  means	  by	  the	  widening	  gap	  between	  will	  and	  the	  impossible	  object	  of	  the	  will;	  my	  anxiety	  grows	  and	  widens	  the	  gap,	  and	  I	  move	  farther	  and	  farther	  away	  from	  both	  the	  will	  and	  it’s	  object.	  	  It	  appears	  that	  Farber’s	  conception	  of	  anxiety	  as	  that	  which	  falls	  between	  an	  A	  and	  B	  mirrors	  the	  philosophical	  perspective,	  which	  illustrates	  anxiety	  as	  the	  middle	  ground	  between	  complacency	  and	  continued	  progression.	  Consider	  the	  following	  statements:	   	  1.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (A)Complacency	  	  Anxiety	  Individuality(B)	  	  2.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (A)Will	  Anxiety	  Impossible	  Object	  of	  the	  Will(B)	  	  In	  the	  first	  statement,	  we	  see	  anxiety	  as	  the	  force	  that	  enables	  transgression	  into	  complacency	  or	  individuality.	  Failure	  to	  seize	  one’s	  own	  most	  possibility,	  according	  to	  Heidegger,	  leads	  one	  into	  the	  public	  sphere;	  the	  ‘they’;	  the	  realm	  of	  complacency.	  The	  choosing	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  choice	  leads	  one	  toward	  a	  life	  constituted	  by	  individuality.	  In	  the	  second	  statement,	  anxiety	  is	  located	  between	  the	  will	  and	  the	  impossible	  object	  of	  the	  will.	  Therefore,	  anxiety	  is	  that	  which	  muddles	  the	  clear	  vision	  of	  she	  who	  wills.	  The	  more	  time	  she	  spends	  in	  anxiety,	  the	  wider	  the	  space	  grows	  between	  A	  and	  B-­‐	  just	  as	  is	  the	  case	  in	  statement	  one.	  Anxiety	  inhibits	  her	  continuation	  onto	  the	  object	  of	  the	  will,	  therefore	  deeming	  it	  impossible.	  	  In	  short,	  anxiety	  falls	  between	  A	  and	  B	  in	  both	  the	  psychoanalytic	  perspective	  and	  the	  philosophical	  perspective.	  In	  statement	  1,	  anxiety,	  when	  taken	  to	  be	  a	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misunderstanding	  leads	  the	  subject	  towards	  A.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  statement	  2,	  anxiety	  is	  presupposed	  as	  a	  misunderstanding,	  always	  already	  inhibiting	  the	  subject’s	  intentional	  aim,	  namely	  the	  object	  of	  the	  will.	  Importantly,	  it	  is	  the	  will	  that	  serves	  as	  
the	  force	  which	  facilitates	  movement	  across	  sphere’s	  of	  existence,	  according	  to	  Farber.	  “Anxiety	  may	  be	  an	  ache	  which	  cries	  for	  relief,	  but	  whether	  or	  what	  will	  occur	  cannot	  be	  anxiety’s	  decision.”	  (REPP,	  289)	  	  	  At	  this	  time,	  let	  us	  revisit	  the	  nonverbal	  aspect	  of	  anxiety,	  as	  it	  pertains	  to	  the	  will.	  	  “The	  failure	  of	  meaning,	  which	  is	  said	  to	  be	  characteristic	  of	  anxiety,	  stems	  from	  the	  deprivation	  of	  resources	  and	  the	  withering	  of	  the	  will’s	  goal	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  will’s	  demands.	  Because	  of	  this	  failure,	  eventually	  the	  anxious	  person	  may	  no	  longer	  be	  able	  to	  say	  what	  he	  is	  anxious	  about.”	  (REPP,	  290)	  	  “Resources”	  refers	  to	  the	  powers	  of	  intellect	  and	  imagination-­‐	  tools	  that	  allow	  for	  the	  articulation	  of	  anxiety	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  occurs	  from	  within,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  articulation	  of	  the	  surrounding	  world.	  Deprivation	  of	  intellect	  and	  imagination	  coupled	  with	  an	  unachievable	  goal	  leaves	  the	  individual	  utterly	  lost.	  Just	  as	  Heidegger	  writes	  of	  the	  “withering	  away	  of	  the	  world”,	  Farber	  too	  writes	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  meaning.	  Here,	  she	  furthers	  the	  Heideggerian	  perspective	  of	  anxiety	  as	  that	  which	  assaults	  from	  “everywhere	  and	  nowhere”	  by	  discussing	  the	  notion	  of	  will.	  To	  say,	  “the	  withering	  of	  the	  will’s	  goal	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  will’s	  demands”	  is	  to	  reiterate	  anxiety	  as	  that	  which	  falls	  between	  the	  will	  and	  the	  impossible	  object	  of	  the	  will.	  Anxiety	  occurs	  not	  only	  because	  of	  this	  aforementioned	  deprivation,	  but	  also	  because	  of	  the	  will’s	  inability	  to	  accomplish	  its	  own	  aim.	  This	  phenomenon	  is	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illustrative	  of	  anxiety’s	  self-­perpetuating	  nature.	  Anxiety	  grows;	  the	  gap	  widens;	  the	  will’s	  demands	  of	  survival	  increase;	  the	  goal	  of	  meaning	  withers	  away.	  	  	   	  	   Earlier	  it	  is	  mentioned	  that	  with	  love	  and	  trust,	  one	  is	  able	  to	  achieve	  the	  openness	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  overcoming	  of	  anxiety;	  this	  is	  the	  ultimate	  aim	  of	  psychotherapy	  according	  to	  Medard	  Boss.	  It	  appears	  then	  that	  love	  and	  trust	  are	  the	  antitheses	  of	  anxiety.	  How	  is	  this	  so?	  It	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  the	  non-­‐anxious	  individual	  is	  perpetually	  in	  love,	  nor	  are	  they	  perpetually	  trusting.	  To	  understand	  love	  and	  trust	  as	  anxiety’s	  opposites,	  one	  must	  not	  consider	  the	  object	  of	  one’s	  love,	  nor	  the	  object	  of	  one’s	  trust.	  Importance	  is	  placed	  instead	  on	  love	  and	  trust	  as	  they	  stand	  as	  distractions	  of	  the	  mind,	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  lead	  one	  away	  from	  the	  restrictiveness	  of	  anxiety,	  into	  an	  openness	  toward	  existence.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  one	  who	  loves,	  Boss	  views	  the	  subject	  as	  having	  a	  “more	  comprehensive,	  authentic	  understanding	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  human	  existence”	  than	  the	  anxious	  individual.	  (REPP,	  83)	  This	  is	  because	  he	  views	  anxiety	  as	  that	  which	  constricts	  one’s	  interpretation	  of	  meaning	  in	  its	  efforts	  to	  drive	  the	  subject	  to	  self-­‐awareness.	  Even	  more	  radical	  is	  his	  view	  of	  dying,	  with	  respect	  to	  he	  who	  loves	  the	  world.	  While	  the	  anxious	  individual	  views	  death	  as	  “an	  impending	  attack	  on	  integrity”,	  he	  who	  loves	  the	  world	  considers	  death	  to	  be	  an	  “absorption	  in	  the	  greater	  entirety	  of	  what	  is	  loved”.	  (REPP,	  83)	  Love	  promotes	  one’s	  openness	  while	  anxiety	  brings	  about	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  narrowness	  one	  feels	  compelled	  to	  fight	  against.	  It	  is	  this	  openness	  that	  translates	  into	  one’s	  opening	  toward	  possibility.	  (Nevertheless,	  it	  is	  anxiety	  itself	  that	  precedes	  one’s	  will	  to	  be	  open.)	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   The	  significance	  of	  trust	  is	  necessary	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  anxiety.	  As	  we	  have	  asserted,	  the	  anxious	  individual	  is	  anxious	  about	  that	  which	  is	  uncertain,	  namely	  the	  repetition	  of	  anxiety.	  As	  the	  anxious	  individual	  contemplates	  her	  future,	  the	  lack	  of	  concreteness	  and	  answers	  drives	  her	  to	  a	  greater	  level	  of	  anxiety,	  where	  uncertainty	  evokes	  a	  continuously	  bombarding	  stream	  of	  invalid	  and	  illogical	  thoughts.	  To	  trust	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Concluding	  Thoughts	  	  	   	  	   The	  philosophies	  of	  Martin	  Heidegger,	  Jean-­‐Paul	  Sartre,	  and	  Søren	  Kierkegaard	  bring	  an	  important	  ideal	  to	  the	  forefront:	  anxiety	  is	  a	  necessary	  component	  in	  aiding	  the	  fundamental	  project	  of	  the	  human	  being.	  By	  serving	  as	  the	  bridge	  between	  two	  spheres,	  anxiety	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  recognized	  enables	  the	  individual	  to	  move	  into	  the	  dimension	  of	  authenticity.	  To	  live	  a	  life	  constituted	  by	  authentic	  possibility	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  human	  freedom.	  To	  live	  freely	  is	  to	  ride	  the	  wave	  of	  anxiety.	  	  	   I	  stated	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  this	  essay	  that	  my	  hope	  was	  for	  my	  philosophical	  pursuit,	  to	  which	  my	  reader	  was	  witness,	  would	  end	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  I	  would	  be	  calmer	  and	  my	  reader	  would	  be	  anxious.	  At	  this	  time,	  I	  have	  finished	  my	  pursuit	  of	  anxiety	  (for	  the	  time	  being),	  and	  I	  remain	  hopeful	  that	  my	  reader	  is	  indeed	  presently	  anxious.	  I	  am	  even	  more	  hopeful	  that	  my	  reader	  understands	  exactly	  what	  I	  mean	  when	  I	  say	  this.	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